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Abstract 
 
Since the late 1990s economic insecurity and political uncertainty have continued to worsen 
in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe’s economy plunged into deep crisis in the early 2000s owing to 
failed fiscal policies and the highly criticised ‘Fast-track’ land reform program. Election 
related violence between 2002 and 2013 resulted in a state of insecurity thereby leading to an 
exodus of Zimbabwean migrants. An unprecedented influx of Zimbabwean migrants to South 
Africa (SA) led to high levels of illegal migration and the clogging up of the asylum seeker 
management system in the early 2000s. In 2009, SA launched the Dispensation of 
Zimbabweans Project (DZP) in order to achieve four main objectives: to reduce pressure on 
the asylum management system, to curb the deportation of illegal Zimbabwean migrants, to 
regularise Zimbabweans who were residing in SA illegally and to provide amnesty to 
Zimbabweans who had obtained South African documents fraudulently. The DZP was 
considered a success and a successor permit, the Zimbabwe Special Dispensation Permit 
(ZSP), was launched in 2014 to allow former DZP applicants to extend their stay in South 
Africa. Using government publications, parliamentary debates, non-governmental 
organization (NGO) and media reports it was found that the DZP reduced pressure on the 
asylum seeker management system while deportation figures dropped significantly. It was 
also found that, less than 6% (250 000) of an estimated 1,5 million undocumented migrants 
were documented during the regularisation processes. The DZP and ZSP projects 
complemented South Africa’s highly restrictive approach to migration management and 
jealous safeguarding of access to permanent residence and citizenship. The regularisation 
projects also enabled the South African government to show sympathy towards Zimbabweans 
who were forced to migrate to South Africa by recognising that they could not return home as 
long as the situation back home remained unchanged.  
Key words: undocumented migrants, illegal migrants, regularisation, international migration, 
Zimbabweans, South Africa.  
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1. Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 International migration and the need for regularisation  
 
1.1.1 International migration  
 
International migration is the movement of people from their countries of origin or habitual 
residence to settle temporarily or permanently in another country (Bariagaber, 2014: 2). 
International migration is characterised by the movement of both, documented (legal) and 
undocumented (illegal) migrants. In South Africa, the legal status of migrants depends on 
whether or not they are in possession of visas or permits which prove that they are legally 
permitted to be in the country. Documented migrants in South Africa are migrants who are 
holders of some form of permit which allows them to reside, work or study in South Africa. 
Refugee permits, work permits, study permits, visitor’s visas, relative’s visas and spousal 
permits are examples of permits and visas which South Africa’s Department of Home affairs 
(DHA) can issue to foreign nationals (Department of Home Affairs [DHA], n.d). There are 
two types of illegal migrants: those who enter the country legally and then contravene the 
legal terms of their permits and those who enter and stay in the country illegally (Dodson & 
Crush, 2015: 3). International migration is caused by multiple economic, political, socio-
cultural and demographic factors (Akokpari, 1999: 77; Bariagaber, 2014: 2). Furthermore, 
migration flows tend to be mixed because human movement can be influenced by more than 
one push or pull factors.  
 
1.1.2 Economic versus Humanitarian migration  
 
Economic migration and humanitarian migration are two common types of international 
migration. Economic migration is the movement of persons based on perceived economic 
advantages (work or business opportunities) in the receiving country (Kok, Gelderblom & 
Van Zyl, 2006: 5). Dominant economic theories of international migration such as the push-
pull theory and the neo-classical equilibrium theory define migration as “primarily a function 
of economic differences between the place of migrants' origin and the country of destination” 
(Bariagaber, 2014: 6). The push-pull theory is migrant-centred in that it focuses on explaining 
how individuals, as rational actors, decide to migrate if there are perceived economic gains in 
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the country of destination. The neo-classical equilibrium theory however views international 
migration as a win-win-win situation. This is so because: (1) migrants benefit by gaining 
expected high earnings in the country of destination, (2) their country of origin experiences 
lower unemployment rates and shortage of household incomes and (3) the country of 
destination gains more human capital, particularly in sectors where most of the local 
population has no desire to work in (Bariagaber, 2014: 7). The neo-classical equilibrium 
theory corresponds with the migration of most Zimbabweans since the early 1990s. The win-
win-win situation in this case has been achieved because: (1) Zimbabwean migrants gain 
financial stability and better livelihoods when they migrate to better economies, (2) 
Zimbabwe benefits from migrants’ remittances and (3) receiving countries such as South 
Africa gain more human capital in multiple sectors of the economy.  
 
Humanitarian migration is often associated with persons fleeing persecution and conflict 
situations. Humanitarian migrants move from their countries of origin or habitual residence to 
more peaceful geographical contexts where threats (migration push factors) are lesser or non-
existent. Unlike economic migrants who make the “rational choice” to migrate for economic 
benefits, asylum seekers and refugees are considered to be “reluctant migrants” who have to 
migrate because of security reasons (Kok, Gelderblom & Van Zyl, 2006: 7). In 1998, the 
parliament of South Africa passed the Refugees Act (Act No. 135 of 1998) as a way of 
formally ensuring adherence to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) international principles and standards relating to asylum seekers and refugees. The 
Act acknowledges refugees as “persons who have fled from their home country or place of 
habitual residence owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons relating to their 
tribe, race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group” 
(Africa Check, 2013).  
 
South Africa remains committed to providing for the “reception of asylum seekers into the 
country, regulating applications, recognising refugee status and providing for the rights and 
obligations following from such” (Wentzel & Tlabela, 2006: 81). However, South Africa 
continues to battle with administrative problems regarding the processing of asylum claims. A 
2016 Africa Check report on asylum seekers in South Africa revealed that “South Africa is 
home to the highest number of unresolved asylum claims in the world” (Stupart, 2016). Since 
1994, South Africa has received most of its humanitarian migrants from Somalia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. According to 
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Dodson and Crush (2015: 3), migration is characterised by varying temporalities (short to 
long term stays in host countries). The demographics of asylum and refugee applicants are 
often determined by the period of time and the political circumstances in each country. After 
the end of civil conflict in Angola and Mozambique for example, fewer asylum applications 
were made by nationals from these two countries (Wentzel & Tlabela, 2006: 80). In the case 
of continued crisis or uncertainty, persons from countries such as the DRC, Zimbabwe and 
Somalia continue to migrate to South Africa and stay for indefinite periods owing to 
situations of persistent crisis. 
 
1.1.3 The big debate: Voluntary versus Forced migration  
 
Based on the definitions of humanitarian and economic migration in the foregoing section it 
is evident that migration is commonly perceived as either voluntary or forced. Voluntary 
migration is mostly associated with economic migrants’ ability to make the rational choice to 
move from their countries of origin to seek better income generating opportunities and a 
better quality of life. Forced migration is commonly associated with the impacts of war, 
persecution on the grounds of one’s religion, ethnicity or political ideology and natural 
disasters such as drought.  
 
In the early 2000s an exodus of migrants from Zimbabwe was caused by political and 
economic factors. However, whether Zimbabwean migrants could be defined as voluntary or 
forced migrants became a controversial subject for debate in the media, amongst politicians, 
civil society actors and in academic spaces. Since the late 1990s, most Zimbabweans have 
been forced to leave their home country owing to the decline of the country’s economy (Tati, 
2008: 428). The collapse of Zimbabwe’s economy was linked to failed economic policies and 
a fast tracked land reform programme which crippled the country’s farming industry. The 
exodus of Zimbabwean migrants is definitely a response to push factors such as high levels of 
unemployment and low household incomes and the pull factor of paid work opportunities in 
South Africa. Some Zimbabweans have cited political violence as a major factor which 
pushed them to migrate. Between 2000 and 2013 episodes of election related violence 
occurred in 2002, 2008 and 2013 and cases of government sponsored violent attacks, 
abductions and torture are not uncommon in Zimbabwe.   
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Figure 1 below shows the three main reasons which were cited by Zimbabwean migrants 
between 1997 and 2007. 
 
Figure 1: Main reason(s) for leaving Zimbabwe by year of departure. 
 
 
Source: (Crush, Chikanda & Tawodzera, 2015: 370) 
 
The economic crisis and employment opportunities were cited as major migration push 
factors between 1997 and 2001. From 2002 to 2004 political reasons were the primary push 
factor for migration. Overall, Figure 1 shows us that Zimbabwe is a source of mixed 
migration flows. The term ‘mixed migration flows’ within the context of this dissertation 
refers to the single migration stream of economic and political migrants. According to Crush, 
Chikanda and Tawodzera (2015: 363) “the term mixed migration is often used in government 
and refugee protection circles to suggest that it is difficult to distinguish between refugees 
and economic migrants within a single migration stream and to craft different policy 
responses for each”. Since the late 1990s, Zimbabwe has become an “archetypal source of 
mixed migration owing to the country’s protracted economic and political crises which have 
generated increasingly heterogeneous forms of migration” (Crush, Chikanda and Tawodzera, 
2015: 364).  
 
South Africa is believed to be the largest recipient of Zimbabwean migrants since the early 
1997        1998       1999       2000      2001        2002        2003       2004       2005       2006       2007 
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2000s (Yoyo, 2014). By 2007 the unprecedented flow of migrants from Zimbabwe was 
defined as “the most extraordinary exodus from a country not at war” (Meldrum, 2007). It is 
the very nature of this recent wave of migration that led to the creation of a special permit for 
Zimbabweans by South Africa’s Department of Home Affairs (DHA). A special permit 
process was required because the regular permit categories which were available for either 
economic migrants or for humanitarian migrants were inadequate and inappropriate. On the 
one hand, the asylum seeker management system could not grant asylum or refugee status to 
many Zimbabweans as most of them were not perceived to be fleeing from armed conflict or 
political persecution. At the same time, most of the migrants did not qualify for regular work 
and business permits. 
 
1.1.4 Why regularisation is important 
 
In order to manage the problems associated with undocumented or illegal migrants, countries 
in Europe and the Americas occasionally implement amnesty or documentation programs. 
Spain, Italy, Canada and the United Kingdom, for example, have in the past resorted to 
granting legal status to illegal migrants as means of regularising their stay. Regularisation is 
an alternative to migration management strategies such as mass deportations, which often do 
not deter illegal migration. Between 1996 and 2000 the South African government approved 
three immigration amnesty programmes which were aimed at granting permanent residence 
status to three categories of undocumented migrants: contract mine workers who had been in 
South Africa for at least 10 years before 1995, undocumented migrants from Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) member states who had entered the country 
clandestinely during the apartheid period and former Mozambican refugees who entered 
South Africa before 1992 (Crush & Williams, 1999: 7; Peberdy, 2001: 20).  
 
Regularisation programmes are created in order to document illegal migrants and to offer 
them an opportunity to formalise their stay in the host country while also giving them the 
legal right to access citizen privileges such as education and health facilities, housing, 
employment opportunities, business permits and social services (Bansak, 2016: 1). 
Regularisation drives also allow host countries to collect more reliable statistics of foreign 
nationals residing in their countries (Polzer, 2009: 3). Such information is vital for policy 
planning especially when it comes to the delivery of public services such as housing, 
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education and health.  
 
Section 31(2) of the South African Immigration Act 13 of 2002 indicates that: 
 
“Upon application, the Minister of Home Affairs may under terms and conditions determined 
by him: grant a foreigner or a category of foreigners the rights of permanent residence for a 
specified or unspecified period when special circumstances exist which should justify such a 
decision. Provided the Minister may (i) exclude one or more identified foreigners from such 
categories (ii) or with good cause, withdraw such rights from a foreigner or a category of 
foreigners” (Immigration Act, No. 13 of 2002, 2002: s31(2); South African Government, 
2014a).  
 
It is according to this Act that the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) has been able to create 
special permit projects to allow undocumented Zimbabweans to legalise and regularise their 
stay in South Africa over the past 7 years. Recognising the economic malaise and political 
instability that had led many Zimbabweans to migrate to other countries in the early 2000s, 
the South African government approved the DHA’s proposals to offer undocumented 
Zimbabweans the opportunity to apply for a 4 year (2010-2014) Dispensation of 
Zimbabweans Project (DZP) permit and subsequently the 3 year (2015-2017) Zimbabwe 
Special Dispensation Permit-ZSP (Pokroy-Rietveld, 2014: 44). 
 
This dissertation is based on an atheoretical desktop research study of the Dispensation of 
Zimbabweans Project (DZP) and Zimbabwe Special Dispensation Permit (ZSP) 
regularisation projects. The DZP and ZSP projects were created in response to the influx of 
undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants and the increase in pressure on the asylum 
application system which resulted from the influx (Amit, 2011: 4; Parliamentary Monitoring 
Group [PMG], 2011). The decision to offer amnesty to illegal Zimbabwean migrants was also 
influenced by the need to retrieve fraudulent South African documents from illegal 
Zimbabweans nationals (South African Government, 2014a). Furthermore, deportations and 
detention efforts seemed to be ineffective methods of deterring illegal migration and illegal 
stays since many of the undocumented Zimbabweans were fleeing from harsh economic 
conditions to secure better livelihoods in South Africa. In July 2007, it was reported that 
deporting Zimbabweans had become an ineffective strategy of curbing illegal migration from 
Zimbabwe since most deportees ended up resurfacing in the country a few days or months 
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after being deported (Meldrum, 2007). South Africa was and remains a destination of choice 
for most Zimbabwean migrants because of its large economy and geographical proximity 
(Lawyers for Human Rights [LHR], 2011].  
 
Immigrant centred policies such as regularisation are important and necessary. In the case of 
the unprecedented and complex nature of migration from Zimbabwe post 2000, it was not 
possible for the DHA to apply existing migration management strategies such as regular 
permit and asylum seeker application processes. Furthermore, hunting down illegal migrants 
and deporting them was not the best way of managing immigrants who were forced to 
migrate since staying at home was not an option for many Zimbabweans at that time. Similar 
to other migration policies, issues of fairness make regularisation “a contentious tool for 
dealing with undocumented migrants” (Bansak, 2016: 1). Researchers and analysts therefore 
need to assess such policies as a means of ascertaining how such programmes can be better 
implemented to benefit both, undocumented migrants and the host country.  
 
1.2 Background information 
 
1.2.1 What led to the unprecedented exodus of Zimbabwean migrants? 
 
The exodus of migrants leaving Zimbabwe for South Africa and other countries began in the late 
1990s when Zimbabwe's economic situation began to deteriorate drastically. Following the 
declaration of independence from British colonial rule in 1980, Zimbabwe’s economic growth 
was negatively affected by recurring episodes of drought. In the early 1990s Zimbabwean policy 
makers sought to liberalise the country’s economy through “the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Program (ESAP), which allowed for an open market economy driven by a strong export base” 
(Munangagwa, 2009: 111). The ESAP macroeconomic policy was also aimed at achieving 
economic recovery and sustained growth but it failed to do so because liberalization exposed the 
country’s industries to “foreign competition for which it was unprepared” (Munangagwa, 2009: 
112). The next economic recovery attempt which was called Zimbabwe Program for Economic 
and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) also failed to save the Zimbabwean economy between 
1996 and 2000. 
 
Owing to poor fiscal policies Zimbabwe’s budget deficit continued to grow. Economic decline 
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began to visibly take place following the crash of the stock market on November 14, 1997. In 
the year 2000, a ‘Fast track’ land reform program was authorised by President Robert Mugabe to 
facilitate land redistribution from white farmers to the majority black populace (Munangagwa, 
2011: 115). White commercial farmers’ farms were taken by force and many of them were given 
short notices to evacuate their farms. The land reform program further exacerbated conditions in 
an already ailing agricultural industry. The fast tracked change of land ownership from 
thousands of white commercial farmers to small-scale black farmers and 
inexperienced/unskilled farmers led to low productivity. Since commercial farming was at the 
time, the largest contributor to Zimbabwe’s national income, low production levels led to the 
collapse of the commercial farming and manufacturing sectors, the consequent displacement of 
millions of workers, food shortages and the collapse of the Zimbabwean economy (“Fast track 
land…”, 2016). 
 
Many Zimbabweans who migrated to South Africa after 1999 fled the economic crisis and 
episodes of election related political violence which occurred during the 2002 and 2008 
presidential elections. Some of them did not have enough financial resources or time to apply for 
passports and permits which would guarantee them legal entry and the opportunity to reside 
legally in South Africa. Over the past few years, Zimbabwe has not fully recovered from 
economic turmoil and economic resuscitation is unexpected in the near future. Based on recent 
nationwide protests and the 2016 #ThisFlag anti-government movement it is evident that 
Zimbabwe has not yet achieved the much needed economic and political recovery to promote 
the return of those who have left the country. If the situation worsens another influx of 
Zimbabwean migrants can be expected in the near future.  
 
South Africa is one of Africa's largest economies thus it attracts migrants from many African 
countries. In the southern African region, South Africa, Botswana and Namibia’s economic 
buoyancy has attracted many migrants from other parts of southern Africa (Oucho, 2006: 67).  
Since the early 2000s, it is believed that the majority of the migrant population (both 
documented and undocumented) in South Africa is from Zimbabwe. According to the 
Consortium for Refugees and Migrants (CoRMSA) as at 2010, the estimated number of 
Zimbabweans living in South Africa, most of them illegally, was about three million (Yoyo, 
2014). As a result of South Africa’s attractiveness to all types of migrants the Department of 
Home Affairs (DHA) has struggled to control growing migration flows and undocumented 
migrants.  
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1.2.2 Policy responses to the influx of Zimbabwean migrants in South 
Africa  
 
Between 20 September 2009 and 31 December 2010, the DHA carried out a documentation and 
regularisation drive for Zimbabwean immigrants under the Dispensation of Zimbabweans 
Project-DZP (Amit, 2011: 4). The DZP was aimed at regularising the status of Zimbabwean 
migrants and allow them to live, work and study in South Africa. The DZP was also aimed at 
relieving pressure on the asylum system which most Zimbabweans had turned to as a means of 
attaining legal status in South Africa upon fleeing the political and economic crisis back 
home. Upon expiry of the DZP permits on 31 December 2014 a new regularisation process was 
initiated to allow DZP permit holders to renew their permits. In August 2014, Mr Malusi Gigaba, 
who was then Minister of Home Affairs, announced that a new permit (the Zimbabwe Special 
Dispensation Permit [ZSP]) had been created in order to allow former DZP applicants to extend 
their stay in South Africa without having to return to Zimbabwe (Chiumia & Van Wyk, 2014).  
ZSP permits are scheduled to expire on 31 December 2017 after which ZSP permit holders have 
to return to Zimbabwe to apply for regular South African work, study or business permits if they 
wish to continue staying in South Africa.  
 
Former DZP and ZSP holders will not be allowed to apply for permanent residence status 
regardless of them having stayed in South Africa for over 5 years (minimum number of years of 
stay in South Africa required for permanent residence applications). According to Minister 
Gigaba, the ZSP was issued as a special permit with special conditions thus if ZSP permit 
holders want to make themselves eligible for permanent residency “they need to migrate to the 
regular permit system, and on that basis, after 5 years they can then apply for permanent 
residency” (Gigaba, 2016 [video file]). 
  
The DZP and ZSP have been hailed as successful regularisation attempts by the DHA but some 
analysts argue that both processes were accompanied by administrative barriers which excluded 
large numbers of undocumented Zimbabwean migrants, especially those who did not have proof 
of work, admission to an educational institution or proof of business ownership. As a result of 
this, very little pressure was relieved from the asylum application system and many 
Zimbabwean immigrants have continued to stay in South Africa illegally since they failed to 
obtain the special permits. Out of approximately 295 000 applications about 245 000 DZP 
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permits were issued in 2010 (Pokroy-Rietveld, 2014: 44). According to the Consortium for 
Refugees and Migrants (CORMSA) as at 2010, the estimated number of Zimbabweans living in 
South Africa, most of them illegally, was about three million but less than a tenth (300, 000) of 
this estimate applied for the special permits (Yoyo, 2014). This therefore means that, less than a 
tenth of the estimated number of Zimbabweans residing in South Africa were able to apply for 
or obtain the DZP permits.  
 
According to Bertossi (2009: 27) regularisation implies a migration cost for receiving 
societies because it is a possible pull-factor for illegal migrants. Bertossi’s supposition 
implies that regularisation processes such as the DZP and ZSP may encourage more 
Zimbabweans to flock to South Africa with the hope of being regularised through special 
permit processes. However, regularisation prevents undocumented migrants from suffering 
negative implications of illegality such as individuals and their families suffering from socio-
economic vulnerability when they are unable to secure employment, school places and 
business permits. Regularisation processes are important because by legalising the stay of 
undocumented migrants, host countries are able to reduce the risks of workplace exploitation 
and promote the protection of migrants under the local laws (Bansak, 2016: 1). Furthermore, 
legalising undocumented migrants increases tax revenues for the host country and it allows 
immigrants to be able to work, study or run businesses and cater for their personal and family 
financial needs without putting pressure on the social service system of the host country 
(Bansak, 2016: 1). In the case of the DZP and ZSP, both processes allowed formerly 
undocumented Zimbabwean migrants to work, study, run business and cater for their personal 
and family needs without adding a lot of pressure on South Africa’s social services and social 
grants.  
 
1.3 Statement of problem and rationale  
 
Migration management is a challenge across the world and countries like South Africa (a 
regional economic power) which receive large numbers of immigrants need to constantly 
redevelop and improve their migration policies in order to cater for different categories of 
migrants. According to the Department of Home Affairs, the DZP and ZSP projects worked 
effectively and a project similar in nature to the ZSP was created for Lesotho nationals who 
had been residing in South Africa illegally before 30 September 2015 (DHA, 2016a). “The 
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Lesotho Special Permit (LSP) was undertaken as a joint programme with the cooperation of 
the South African and Lesotho governments and it is expected to benefit over 400,000 
Lesotho nationals” (DHA, 2016a). The DZP process was based on bilateral cooperation 
between South Africa’s Department of Home Affairs and Zimbabwe's Ministry of Home 
Affairs. Despite the DHA’s satisfaction with the dispensation processes as an effective way 
of dealing with the migration management problems which arose from the influx of 
undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants post 2000, there are no reliable statistics on 
undocumented migration due to historical underreporting and the South African 
government’s tendency to exaggerate immigration numbers to justify more restrictions 
(Africa Check, 2013; Stupart, 2016).  
 
Moving forward, the DHA seeks to ensure that South Africa creates a “modern, progressive 
and robust policy on international migration which will take into account the enormous 
current and potential contribution of immigrants to South Africa, and to improve South 
Africa’s connectedness with the rest of the world, while minimizing associated risks and 
protecting national interests” (DHA, 2015a). While pursuing these interests it is in South 
Africa’s best interests to continue looking into Zimbabwean-specific migration management 
processes considering the reality that Zimbabweans make up the majority of South Africa's 
immigrant population and the push and pull factors which influence the migration of 
Zimbabweans to South Africa persist. Deportations and stricter regulations may serve as 
discouraging factors but it is also a reality that immigrants continue to negotiate various 
loopholes, some dangerous and life threatening to enter and stay in South Africa. Research 
has revealed that borders and tight border control systems do not present any real obstacle to 
persons who want to move into South Africa (Wentzel & Tlabela, 2006: 79).  
 
Research questions and propositions  
 
Having established that regularisation is an ideal migration management tool which the DHA 
has acknowledged can be “effective”, it is important to assess the regularisation attempts 
which the DHA has established in the recent past. Should further regularisation projects be 
found feasible, an assessment of former regularisation policies such as the DZP and ZSP is 
required. The assessment of the DZP and ZSP regularisation processes in this dissertation is 
based on the following questions: 
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1. In what way(s) did the DZP and ZSP contribute to the management of undocumented 
Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa? 
2. What were the benefits and challenges associated with the implementation of the DZP 
and ZSP regularisation projects? 
 
The aforementioned research questions were influenced by the researcher’s proposition that the 
DZP and ZSP regularisation processes did not adequately address the problems associated with 
the influx of undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants. This proposition is based on two key 
factors.   
 
1. Temporary solution  
 
Given that the economic conditions which forced many Zimbabweans to migrate to South Africa 
have not changed for the better, most ZSP holders are unlikely to willingly return to Zimbabwe 
to apply for regular permits. Zimbabweans continue to make up the largest number of 
undocumented migrants and the situation in Zimbabwe is unlikely to improve in the near future 
therefore Zimbabwean immigrants remain a special category of immigrants that cannot be easily 
ignored in future policy making processes. An assessment of the DZP and ZSP projects is 
therefore required in order to inform future special dispensation projects.  
 
2. The DZP and ZSP projects were open to a select few 
 
Firstly, of the estimated three million Zimbabwean immigrants, less than 300, 000 applied for 
the DZP permits thus less than a tenth of the estimated population were able to regularise their 
stay in South Africa. Despite the probability that the 3 million estimation was an incorrect figure 
many undocumented Zimbabweans were excluded from DZP and ZSP application processes 
because they were not in possession of either one or two of the primary requirements (a valid 
Zimbabwean passport and/or proof of work, study or business operations). Like most migration 
management tools, the DZP and ZSP permit application processes were only open to 
undocumented migrants who had the privileges of employment, business ownership and places 
at academic institutions.  
 
Secondly, the DHA did not pay attention to the gendered nature of access to formal sector 
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employment thereby discriminating against undocumented Zimbabwean female migrants who 
are involved in informal sector jobs such as housekeeping and child care services. Research has 
shown that, female migrants have historically travelled to work in South Africa without 
obtaining official permission (Wentzel & Tlabela, 2006: 79). Between 1997 and 2010 the 
percentage of Zimbabwean female migrants rose from 39% to 44% and it can be expected to 
be as high as 48% by the end of 2017 (Crush, Chikanda & Tawodzera, 2015: 368). Given 
this, it is important to ensure that migration management strategies pay attention to the 
gendered dynamics of migration and female migrants’ survival strategies.  
 
Thirdly, only DZP holders were allowed to apply for the ZSP permits in 2014 thus no new 
special permit application processes were created to facilitate the documentation of more 
Zimbabweans regardless of the reality that very few undocumented migrants were assisted in the 
2009/2010 DZP project. Even though the DHA acknowledged that the DZP worked well, the 
South African government had no intentions to give amnesty to more Zimbabweans after 2010.  
 
1.4 Purpose of the research study 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to assess the extent to which the DHA managed to achieve the 
goals it sought to achieve by means of creating special permit projects for undocumented 
Zimbabweans. The successes and failures resulting from the two processes will be assessed as 
a means of deriving important lessons from the two regularisation projects. This research 
study is important for four reasons: 
 
1. Academic research development 
 
Very few studies have been conducted on the DZP and ZSP regularisation processes. Most of 
the research on immigration in South Africa looks at xenophobia and migrants’ survival 
strategies. Available research on the DZP and ZSP has been done by the African Centre for 
Migration and Society (ACMS), the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants (CoRMSA), 
Africa Check and the Forced Migration Studies Programme (FMSP). This dissertation 
contributes to existing knowledge regarding the DZP and ZSP regularisation processes. 
International migration has over the years become an important academic area of study as the 
trends and effects of international migration continue to pose stiff challenges to policy changes 
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in Africa and elsewhere around the world thus it is a relevant and contemporary issue to study 
(Bariagaber, 2014: 3).  This is especially true in the case of South Africa which is at present, 
one of the largest recipients of migrants in Africa (Tati, 2008: 423; Africa Check, 2013).  
 
2. Policy-relevance 
 
The dissertation seeks to address the problem of inadequate existing national migration 
instruments especially with regards to the management of economic migrants and mixed 
migration flows. As indicated earlier, ‘mixed migration flows’ within the context of this 
dissertation refers to the single migration stream of economic and political migrants from 
Zimbabwe since the early 2000s. According to the Forced Migration Studies Programme 
(FMSP), SADC countries are not capacitated to deal with the scale and flows of migration such 
as those originating from the exodus of Zimbabwean migrants in recent years, thus a study of 
South Africa's DZP and ZSP regularisation processes is an important way of seeking solutions 
to the migration challenges which are currently being faced by South Africa and her neighbours 
(Kiwanuka & Monson, 2009: 6).  
 
3. Human rights concerns 
 
International migration in general, is on the rise and some migration specialists believe that is 
unlikely to slow down in the near future (Bariagaber, 2014: 17). South Africa is home to over 3 
million of the world’s 244 million international migrants (Kirk, 2016). As a recipient of large 
volumes of mixed migration flows South Africa has to pay attention to the human rights of 
humanitarian, economic and survival migrants alike. Mixed migration flows such as the exodus 
of Zimbabwean migrants post 2000 are a key area of focus which South Africa needs to look at 
through a humanitarian lens.   
 
4. Administrative efficiency 
 
This study is relevant because it assesses the practice of outsourcing permit processing 
services from Visa Facilitation Services (VFS) during the ZSP process in 2014. The DZP 
project was implemented via the traditional permit application system of using Home Affairs 
offices as sites for permit application submissions, processing and permit collections. Since 
2014 visa applications are now being submitted to Visa Facilitation Services (VFS) centres 
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across the country. The DHA continues to adjudicate permit applications and the collection of 
permit application outcomes is facilitated by VFS. The 2014 ZSP regularisation process was 
implemented using the new VFS-DHA system. This research study compares the 
administrative efficiency of the DZP and ZSP processes in Chapter five in order to establish 
whether administrative inefficiency and other bureaucratic shortfalls were curtailed by means 
of outsourcing VFS services. It is also important to assess the VFS facilitated ZSP process 
since it will be utilised for future visa processes which may include, special dispensation 
permit projects such as the Dispensation of Zimbabweans Project (DZP), the Zimbabwe 
Special Dispensation Permit (ZSP) and the Lesotho Special Permit (LSP). 
 
1.5 Methodology  
 
This research study is based on a desktop study of journal articles, organisation reports, 
government publications and academic papers which look at the Dispensation of 
Zimbabweans Project (DZP) and Zimbabwe Special Dispensation Permit (ZSP) 
regularisation policies. News articles and Parliamentary Monitoring Group (PMG) reports 
were also considered in order to assess reports and updates on the regularisation processes 
between 2010 and 2016. 
 
1.6 Limitations  
 
In-depth interviews could have been utilised as a complementary research tool for the 
proposed research but owing to time and financial constraints the researcher was 
unfortunately unable to conduct in-depth interviews. It takes time to schedule appointments 
and interviews with government officials thus the researcher recommends the use of 
interview methods in future long-term studies.  
 
1.7 Chapter outline 
 
The first chapter outlined the background information regarding international migration, 
regularisation and the factors which led the DHA to implement the DZP and ZSP 
regularisation projects. Chapter two provides a literature review of journal articles, reports 
and book chapters which discuss South Africa’s migration management strategies since 1994. 
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The literature review section will also discuss the historical relationship between South Africa 
and Zimbabwe and how this relationship influenced South Africa’s decision to implement the 
DZP and ZSP projects. The third chapter provides an in-depth assessment of the DZP project. 
The fourth chapter provides an assessment of the 2014 ZSP process. Both chapter three and 
four outline the strengths and weaknesses of DZP and ZSP regularisation projects 
respectively. Chapter five will provide an overall assessment of the benefits and shortfalls of 
the DZP and ZSP projects and make recommendations for future regularisation process.  
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2. Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
2.1 Zimbabwe-South Africa relations  
 
Zimbabwe and South Africa enjoy a special relationship born of geographical contiguity, 
economic interdependence, shared political interests and historical ties between the South 
Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) and the Zimbabwe African National Union- 
Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) ruling parties (Mlambo, 2016: 20). Geographically, Zimbabwe 
sits at the north of South Africa. Economically, Zimbabwe provides a road transport route for 
businesses and traders to countries such as Mozambique, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. In addition to this, South Africa and Zimbabwe have been 
each other’s largest trading partners since the late 1800s (Mlambo, 2016: 22). At the moment, 
South Africa gains a lot from exporting goods and manufactured products to Zimbabwe. 
South African businesses also gain profits from Zimbabwean migrants who buy groceries for 
their families back home. Both countries have a shared history of liberation struggles as they 
defended each other in the fight to end colonialism. Furthermore, the ANC is indebted to the 
ZANU-PF and other African liberation movements for the support which it received during 
the anti-apartheid struggle (Prys, 2008: 18; Hengari, 2014: 15). “The ANC’s history of 
struggle and liberation is strongly embedded in an anti-colonialist liberation tradition in 
Southern Africa” (Hengari, 2014: 14). In terms of political interests “there is a shared sense 
of irritation regarding the condescending attitudes of Western leaders towards African 
countries and their tendency to lecture African states on how democracy, good governance 
and fiscal policies should be run” (Prys, 2008: 16; Mlambo, 2016: 29).  
 
Owing to the aforementioned geographical, economic, historical and political factors it is 
evident that South Africa’s silence when the Mugabe regime initiated the farm take overs in 
2000 and South Africa’s endorsement of flawed Zimbabwean presidential elections in 2008 
and 2013 could have been influenced by the special relationship between the two countries’ 
ruling parties. Instead of publicly condemning political violence and criticising the 
Zimbabwean government, former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, repeatedly pointed 
out that Zimbabwe was a sovereign state. He defended South Africa’s quiet diplomacy by 
arguing that there was no viable alternative to South Africa’s supposed disappointing 
response because, “by its very nature, diplomacy precludes loud pronouncements from roof 
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tops” (Mlambo, 2016: 28). In 2007, Thabo Mbeki avoided describing Zimbabwe’s situation 
as a refugee creating situation. Rather, he simply conceded that the enormous human influx 
from Zimbabwe was a reality which South Africans had to live with (Meldrum, 2007). 
 
Since 2008, South Africa’s policy towards Zimbabwe, in the context of Zimbabwe’s multi-
layered crisis has been criticised for being ineffectual, disappointing and inappropriate quiet 
diplomacy (Mlambo, 2016: 19). South Africa’s perceived role as a regional economic and 
political power has been framed as a strength which the South African government can utilise 
in order to coerce President Mugabe and his government to practice good governance and 
work towards processes of economic recovery. Even though South Africa is an economic 
power in the southern African region and on the African continent it cannot and it has not 
exercised a high level of political influence over Zimbabwe. Furthermore, President 
Mugabe’s age and untouchable status as an African liberation hero make it difficult for fellow 
African leaders to challenge or question him (Prys, 2008: 14). 
 
In 2009 South Africa was appointed to mediate the political deadlock between ZANU-PF and 
major opposition parties. Thabo Mbeki, who was the South African president at the time 
initiated talks to facilitate the creation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) - an 
interparty political power sharing agreement between the ZANU-PF and two formations of 
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (Matyszak & Reeler, 2011: 2). There were 
general assumptions that “South Africa could use its power and influence to compel President 
Mugabe’s regime to the toe line” but this was not the case (Mlambo, 2016: 29). The Global 
Political Agreement (GPA) was not fully adhered to and the reforms which were agreed upon 
during the negotiations were not implemented.  
 
With regards to the influx of Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa, even though the South 
African government was aware of the issues which had influenced the exodus of migrants in 
the early 2000s it did not publicly condemn the Zimbabwean government for failing to 
resolve Zimbabwe’s political and economic challenges. Furthermore, by endorsing the 
questionable elections which President Mugabe and his party had won under unfair 
conditions South Africa dodged the burden that it would have had to bear if the political 
climate in Zimbabwe had been declared as dangerous. Declaring a political crisis in 
Zimbabwe would justify the migration of Zimbabweans and Zimbabweans’ applications for 
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asylum and refugee status in South Africa. According to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) “refugees include persons fleeing from armed conflict 
or political persecution” (Edwards, 2016). By declaring that Zimbabwe was not in a deep 
political crisis South Africa could therefore continue dismissing undocumented Zimbabwean 
migrants as not worthy to apply for asylum since they were not fleeing from any kind of 
persecution.  
 
According to Prys (2008: 17), South Africa cannot afford to be aggressive towards Zimbabwe 
thus adopting a strategy of denial is the best option for South Africa to take when it comes to 
responding to Zimbabwe’s political and economic problems. However, the numbers of 
Zimbabwean migrants multiplied in the early 2000s. Legal entries alone rose from about 
500 000 per year in 2000 to 1 million in 2006 and about 1,5 million by 2010 (Crush, 
Chikanda & Tawodzera, 2015: 366). Undocumented migration became a major problem 
which the Department of Home Affairs could not ignore especially following outbreaks of  
xenophobic violence in South Africa. Arrests and deportations were unfruitful because many 
deportees returned to South Africa since the situation in Zimbabwe was not improving. 
Deportations have been very costly for the DHA and reports showed that at some point “the 
budget for the deportation of foreign nationals was exhausted resulting in challenges relating 
to transfers of deportees and deportations from Lindela repatriation centre” (DHA, 2015b: 
82).  
 
It is evident that it is difficult to imagine a situation whereby Zimbabwe would heed to South 
Africa’s advice thus continued quiet diplomacy seems to be the best and only way of 
responding to the Zimbabwean situation. The geographical, economic, historical and political 
realities which shape Zimbabwe-South Africa relations make it complex and dangerous for 
South Africa to criticise the Zimbabwean government or to denounce political violence and 
claims that the country is peaceful. It can be argued that, due to its economic decline, 
Zimbabwe is increasingly in less and less of a position to reject proposals from South Africa. 
However, South African leaders need to tread carefully in order to avoid implementing 
drastic foreign policies towards their neighbour. For example, military action or supporting 
opposition and anti-government forces may lead to a major crisis which will have grave spill 
over effects because of the geographical links between the two countries (Prys, 2008: 19). 
Creating barriers such as closing the borders and imposing economic and trade related 
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sanctions against Zimbabwe would hurt Zimbabwe and also impair South Africa’s economy 
because Zimbabwe provides South Africa with trade routes to other countries and it is South 
Africa’s largest trading partner.  
 
2.2 Migration management in South Africa  
 
2.2.1 The role of the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) 
 
According to the South African Government (2016), the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) 
is responsible for facilitating the documentation of citizens, asylum seekers, refugees, tourists 
and ‘acceptable’ foreign nationals. The DHA is responsible for the “effective, secure and 
humane management of immigration” as well as providing services which are “accessible, 
efficient and corruption free” (South African Government, 2016). It is against this backdrop 
of values that the DHA strives to fulfil its mandate when it comes to migration management.  
 
In terms of providing accessible services, the South African government has ensured that 
each province has Home Affairs offices and Visa Facilitation Centres to cater for citizens and 
foreign nationals. In terms of efficiency it is important for the DHA to ensure that service 
delivery is timeous in order to allow migrants to be processed and documented within a short 
period of time. Efficiency has not been achieved in many aspects and it is a value which is 
not easy to measure. For the purposes of this dissertation one can look at efficiency as an 
important value in terms of fast processing of permit applications. Furthermore, efficiency is 
also linked to the DHA’s ability reach out to as many applicants as possible depending on 
projected targets, in terms of the estimated numbers of undocumented Zimbabwean migrants 
residing in South Africa during the announcement of special permit projects.  
 
Corruption free services are an ideal which any government department should strive to 
achieve. Corruption impairs service delivery when some applicants are unfairly excluded 
because they cannot pay bribes to obtain permits while those who have the means to bribe 
officials have an unfair advantage. The implementation of electronic visa application systems 
and the handling of permit application submissions by the Visa Facilitation Services (VFS) 
since 2014 has addressed this issue to some extent. However, corruption remains a challenge 
for the DHA (DHA, 2015b: 94). 
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Security is an important state value and in the case of South Africa, security has been taken to 
mean that the government has the mandate to “ensure the safety and security of its citizens, 
their children and all legitimate visitors” (Parliament of the Republic of South Africa. 
[Portfolio Committee of Home Affairs], (2014a). The Portfolio Committee of Home Affairs 
continues to reiterate the need to ensure that the “permeable nature of the country is resolved” 
and that challenges which are associated with an influx of illegal migrants and corruption are 
eradicated (Portfolio Committee of Home Affairs (2014a). Humane management of 
immigration is an important value which the DHA seeks to achieve but reports of xenophobic 
attitudes of DHA officials and the violent manner in which arrests, detentions and 
deportations are handled reveal that South Africa has failed to promote this value.  
 
2.2.2 How do migrants become illegal in South Africa?  
 
While some migrants enter the country illegally there are some migrants who enter South 
Africa legally through borders and airports but end up being illegal when they overstay the 
number of days stipulated for their legal stay. Even though “illegal immigrants are generally 
perceived to have entered South Africa without required documents, a substantial number of 
illegal migrants enter the country with appropriate documents” (Campbell, 2007: 4). Letsiri 
(2012: 13) indicated that a substantial number of illegal Zimbabweans who had entered South 
Africa through legal processes were “persons with expired study permits, previously 
employed persons whose residence and work permits had expired, tourists who overstayed 
and visiting family members who overstayed the duration of their permits”.  
 
South Africa “discourages illegal migration by encouraging foreign nationals to apply for 
relevant permits from their home countries” (South African Government, 2016). This policy 
also “prevents people from using visitor’s visas to look for work” in South Africa (Peberdy, 
2001: 17). Permit or visa renewals may be done in South Africa if terms and conditions such 
as submitting applications for renewal 30 to 60 days before the expiry of a current permit are 
met. Most migrants from southern African countries, including Zimbabwe (since 2009) do 
not need to acquire permits from their home countries if they intend to visit South Africa for 
a short period of time. They can obtain visitor’s visas at South Africa’s various points of 
entry on condition that their intended stay will not exceed the 90-day limit on visitor’s visas 
(DHA, 2016b). This means that there is still an opportunity for Zimbabweans and other 
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eligible African migrants to travel to South Africa legally and stay beyond 90 days therefore 
becoming illegal. Despite the discouraging nature of South Africa’s immigration laws, 
migrant flows have not dwindled significantly as more and more migrants continue to travel 
to South Africa to seek better living conditions. Some continue to walk across borders 
illegally or swim across the Limpopo River in order to enter the country illegally. Others 
utilise legal entry points by entering on visitor’s permits and then acquiring fraudulent 
documents (Peberdy, 2001: 20). 
 
Undesirable persons  
 
In the past, immigrants who overstayed in South Africa were liable to pay a fine before being 
allowed to re-enter the country. In May 2014, the DHA announced that fines would no longer 
be charged to persons who overstayed the duration of their permits in South Africa. Rather, a 
more draconian rule was introduced. New regulations were put in place to ensure that any 
foreign national who overstayed in South Africa would be declared undesirable and ineligible 
to enter or live in South Africa for a period of time ranging from 1 to 5 years depending on 
the length of their overstay period (First Step Immigration and Visa Services, 2014; South 
African Government, 2016). These new regulations emerged from the removal of Directive 
43 of 2010 which allowed foreign nationals to exit and re-enter South Africa while their 
permit applications were still pending as long as the migrants could provide proof that they 
had applied for a permit (Intergate Immigration, 2014).  
 
The challenges posed by the removal of Directive 43 of 2010 are many but there are two 
main ones which are relevant to this dissertation. Firstly, Zimbabweans cannot apply for 
permits and travel between South Africa and Zimbabwe before they know the outcome of 
their permit application regardless of how long the DHA will take to process the permit. 
Secondly, those who overstay are unlikely to pass through legal ports of entry for fear of 
being declared undesirable. This means that more illegal migrants are likely to remain in 
South Africa for fear of being deported and declared undesirable at immigration entry/exit 
points. The new regulations can, to some extent, however, deter foreign nationals from 
attempting to overstay the duration of their permits. The removal of Directive 43 of 2010 and 
the risk of becoming undesirable are clear signs that South Africa’s migration management 
strategies continue to be restrictive and punitive. No country can be denied the right to 
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implement policies which discourage overstays and illegal migration but sometimes such 
policies have the unintended consequence of causing the problems which they are meant to 
prevent- illegal stays in this case.  
 
The numbers problem: we do not know how many illegal migrants are in South Africa 
 
It is evident that migrants earn the status of being illegal in different ways. It is therefore 
difficult to accurately count the number of illegal immigrants living in the country. There are 
no reliable figures on illegal migrants living in South Africa because it is extremely difficult 
to mobilise accurate data about undocumented persons (Campbell, 2007: 5; Meldrum, 2007). 
Several estimates can be derived mostly from gathering information from deportation records 
and data captured of lawful entrants per annum, but such statistics do not give an accurate 
estimate of how many illegal and legal foreign nationals are residing in South Africa at any 
one time.  
 
In 2010, the estimated number of undocumented Zimbabwean migrants was believed to be 
about 1,5 million (Pokroy, 2012: 40). The total number (both documented and 
undocumented) of Zimbabweans residing in South Africa then, was believed to be between 
one and three million (Chiumia, 2013; Yoyo, 2014). However, asylum claims and DZP 
applications were below 500, 000 which leads one to question whether there are indeed over 
a million illegal Zimbabwean migrants who have not opted for any kind of legalisation 
process. The lack of precise figures and the high estimates are “based on both government 
and non-governmental organisations’ vested interests in exaggerating immigration numbers” 
(Chiumia, 2013). By exaggerating the estimates of undocumented migrants the government 
can justify tighter immigration controls while non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can 
secure donor funding for reaching out to a popular cause (Chiumia, 2013).  
 
2.3 An exclusive and increasingly restrictionist approach towards migrants 
 
2.3.1 Xenophobic sentiments and an exclusive immigration policy  
 
According to Sally Peberdy (2001: 15), South Africa’s “shift towards citizenship and 
inclusivity as markers of belonging has led paradoxically to an exclusive and increasingly 
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restrictionist immigration policy”. The first Home Affairs Minister of a democratic South 
Africa, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, spent his 10-year tenure putting in place “a strict anti-
immigration regime, particularly aimed at keeping low or unskilled African migrants out of 
the country” (Hammerstad, 2011: 2). In 1995 Mangosuthu Buthelezi declared that, “with 
whatever empathy or understanding one may judge the reasons and motivations of why 
people are compelled to leave their home countries to seek refuge in South Africa, the 
interests of South Africa and her citizens and legal residents must be the first and foremost 
consideration” (Peberdy, 2001: 15). This statement reveals that South Africa’s policies 
towards migrants take a South Africa people first approach thus reducing migrants to a 
category of persons that do not require much of governments’ attention or assistance.  
 
South Africa’s exclusive and increasingly restrictionist immigration policy is complemented 
by anti-foreigner public sentiments in South Africa. Xenophobia is a huge threat which is 
faced by African foreign nationals residing in South Africa as shown by the 2008 and 2015 
waves of xenophobic attacks and the everyday use of terms such as “makwerekwere” (a 
South African derogatory term which describes African foreign nationals). Research has 
revealed that over 60% of South Africans would “favour a highly restrictionist entry policy 
and draconian response to illegal migration” and “1 in 4 South Africans reported that they 
would be happy if non-citizens did not come to South Africa at all” (Mattes, Crush & 
Richmond, 2000: 8). The link between exclusionary policies and xenophobic sentiments 
therefore promotes the continuation of restrictive policies in the best interest of the people of 
South Africa. “In practice, illegal migrants are usually seen as African while undocumented 
migrants from elsewhere are largely ignored” (Peberdy, 2001: 19). This is especially relevant 
if one looks at the waves of xenophobic violence which have occurred across South Africa 
over the past 10 years. The 2015 episode of xenophobic violence which started in the Kwa-
Zulu Natal Province led to the use of the term “Afrophobia” to define xenophobic attacks 
against African foreign nationals. Arrests, detentions and deportations are also often 
associated with African migrants on South African soil. 
 
Politically, policy platforms on immigration have been fraught with xenophobic, exclusionary 
discourses and vigorous attempts to discourage both legal and illegal migration (Peberdy, 
2001: 16). For example, the Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) and the Democratic Alliance (DA) 
opposition parties have often advocated for tougher policy reforms when it comes to 
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immigration. There has been a general shift towards encouraging skilled migration and 
tourism over the past few years thus immigrant selection in South Africa is overtly tied to 
criteria of productivity, wealth and skills thereby excluding many potential migrants from the 
SADC region. This therefore excludes persons who are involved in the informal labour sector 
and domestic labour market (mostly women) since their skills and professions are not 
regarded as necessary or required. 
 
2.3.2 Lack of gender sensitive migration management strategies  
  
Modern studies of survival migration, mixed migration flows and migration management 
tools need to be gender-sensitive. In recent years, women have formed an increasing 
proportion of both economic and humanitarian migration (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development [OECD], n.d.). Between 1997 and 2010 the percentage of 
Zimbabwean female migrants in South Africa rose from 39% to 44%. The percentage of 
documented Zimbabwean female migrants is expected to be as high as 48% of the total 
number of documented Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa by the end of 2017 (Crush, 
Chikanda & Tawodzera, 2015: 368). Table 1 below shows more detailed information about 
the demographic profiles of Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa. It is important to note 
that these figures are based on records of legal migration. Research has revealed that, female 
migrants have historically travelled to work in South Africa without obtaining official 
permission (Wentzel & Tlabela, 2006: 79). Illegal migration and traditional gender based 
economic activities which influence the type of work which many undocumented female 
migrants are usually involved in are not recognized in South Africa’s immigration policy. 
When female migrants enter a country they may be admitted to jobs such as domestic work 
and child care services- skills which are not recognized as part of the formal labour sector 
(Boyd & Grieco, 2003: 5).  
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Source: (Crush, Chikanda & Tawodzera, 2015: 368). 
 
Major recipients of international migrants such as South Africa have to manage issues 
associated not only with growing numbers of migrants but also with the gender dynamics of 
migration flows. Research evidence has shown that there is an increase in the number of 
female persons migrating from their countries of origin or permanent residence (OECD, n.d). 
According to the International Organization for Migration (2015), “women constitute 48% of 
the international migrant stock worldwide”. According to Nicos Trimikliniotis and Mihaela 
Fulias-Souroulla (2009: 23) female immigrants often have limited opportunities in the 
countries of destination and they are often forced into undocumented work. Because of their 
migratory status, many undocumented Zimbabwean female migrants residing in South Africa 
have limited job opportunities. Most undocumented Zimbabwean female migrants end up 
working typical low-skilled female jobs such as domestic labour, sex work and small scale 
trading.  
 
According to a research study conducted by Chipo Hungwe in 2012, sex work is one of the 
main sources of income for Zimbabwean female migrants who do not have access to well-
paid formal sector jobs in the Gauteng province (Hungwe, 2013: 64). Migration management 
Table 1: Demographic profile of Zimbabweans in South Africa (1997-2010) 
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policies therefore need to consider documenting undocumented female migrants including 
those who work in the informal labour sector. This not only empowers undocumented 
migrant women to documented status but guarantees them access to services such as health 
care facilities (Trimikliniotis & Fulias-Souroulla, 2009: 26). Any future project which seeks 
to address the problem of undocumented migrants needs to tackle the restrictive policies 
which have a disempowering effect on women who are not part of the formal sector.  
 
2.3.3 The need for critical skills and other economic interests 
 
South Africa’s immigration policy is mainly aimed at attracting and importing critical and 
scarce skills for occupations in fields such as Engineering, Architecture, Health, Life and 
Earth Sciences and Academia. Furthermore, the government of South Africa seeks to ensure 
that “the contribution of foreign nationals to the labour market does not adversely affect the 
employment rates or the standards and expectations of South African citizens” (South African 
Government, 2016). Research has shown that South Africa has a selective immigration policy 
which is mostly open to persons with critical skills which South Africa has a shortage of 
(South African Government, 2016). Ironically, these restrictions may have increased the rates 
of undocumented migration as people who have been refused visas or those who are not 
eligible for available visa and permit categories resort to entering and living in the country 
illegally (Peberdy, 2001: 18).  
 
According to a qualitative study conducted by Chipo Hungwe (2013) on the survival 
strategies of Zimbabwean migrants in Kempton Park and Tembisa, South African migration 
policies are not outsider friendly. This means that Zimbabwean immigrants’ labour market 
opportunities are inevitably limited thereby pushing them into informal sector jobs or 
unscrupulous underground activities while concealing their identities (Hungwe, 2013: 52).  
This therefore increases the numbers of undocumented Zimbabwean migrants residing in 
South Africa thereby perpetuating the problem of undocumented migration and unreliable 
migration data. The imbalance between increasing migration and migration restrictions leads 
to the use of informal entry routes by migrants, thereby creating further challenges for 
receiving countries (Akokpari, 2000: 73).  
 
35 
 
35 
 
Peberdy (2001: 18) contends that increasing barriers to entry is a practice which is inherently 
restrictionist and directed at persons from African countries since most of them do not qualify 
for special skills permits or they are unable to obtain general work permits because potential 
employers often need to justify why the positions they have offered to foreign nationals 
cannot be filled by South African citizens and permanent residents. Furthermore, most job 
advertisements stipulate that applications are only open to citizens or permanent residents. 
This therefore means that in order to enter into the formal labour sector some migrants may 
end up acquiring fraudulent South African documents. According to the DHA’s Director 
General (DG), Mkuseli Apleni, immigration poses security threats to the country’s 
“sovereignty and public safety” but it is also needed in order to promote the economy 
(InSession, 2014). South Africa’s migration management policy and immigration regulations 
therefore strive to attract desirable migrants (those whose migration and skills are perceived 
to offer South Africa high economic benefits) and deter or inhibit those who are unwanted 
and undocumented.  
 
South Africa’s migration dilemma can be best explained using Hollifield’s assertion that 
“modern states are trapped in a liberal paradox whereby, in order to maintain competitive 
advantage, governments must keep their economies open to investment, trade and migration 
while also having to safeguard the territorial boundaries of the state thereby requiring them to 
regulate migration while also allowing for some degree of openness” (Hollifield, 2004: 901). 
The effects and management of international immigration in South Africa cannot be fully 
understood without reference to the economic history of South Africa (Kabwe-Segatti & 
Landau, 2008: 29). Since the establishment of the post-apartheid government in 1994 
discourse regarding national interests has highly influenced government’s migration 
management policies. The role of migration in South Africa is mostly appreciated with 
regards to South Africa’s need to attract migrants who have special skills which South Africa 
is short of in order to boost South Africa’s economy and development. Low skilled labour is 
also required to some extent, especially in sectors such as mining and agriculture (Kabwe-
Segatti & Landau, 2008: 30).  
 
South Africa’s management of migration is embedded in the country’s position in the global 
political economy. Based on its neo-liberal economic aspirations and current position as one 
of Africa’s largest economies South Africa has a vital role to play when it comes to 
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promoting more open borders and stimulating economic activity within the southern African 
region (Kabwe-Segatti & Landau, 2008: 31). However, South Africa’s realist approach to 
regional trade and migration policy contradicts these values. This is particularly evident in the 
way in which South Africa tends to focus more on facilitating free trade and recruiting 
foreign nationals with skills that are deemed as critical for South Africa’s economy while 
remaining hesitant to promote the free movement of persons who do not fit into this category.  
 
2.3.4 The criminalisation of illegal migrants  
 
Arrests, detention and deportation are some of the strategies which the South African 
government employs in order to deter illegal migration (Peberdy, 2001: 22). Since 1994 the 
government has worked at strengthening border control and mobilising police and armed 
forces to patrol entry points. However, the effectiveness of these measures has always been 
low. This was especially true during the mass exodus of Zimbabwean migrants in the early 
2000s, a period during which the DHA discovered that most Zimbabwean deportees ended up 
resurfacing in the country after being deported from South Africa (Meldrum, 2007). 
 
The South African government has in the past called for police and military operations to 
crackdown on criminals and illegal migrants. For example, during Operation Crackdown in 
the year 2000, of the 1 974 arrests made, 391 were illegal immigrants (“2000 arrested in…”, 
2000). During the 2015 nationwide Operation Fiela, undocumented migrants were taken to 
Lindela Home Affairs Centre and deported according to their countries of origin. The 
operation was aimed at creating safer South African communities and ensuring adherence to 
the laws of the country. According to the Government Communication and Information 
System (2015), 1 123 undocumented migrants were part of the 2 908 arrests which were 
made during a massive 2-day Fiela operation on 30 and 31 August. This meant that the 
majority of arrests during the 2 days were mostly undocumented migrants thereby leading to 
criticism by analysts who indicated that Fiela had become a state-sponsored case of 
xenophobia. Operation Fiela had been introduced after a spate of xenophobic attacks in 
Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal provinces (Maromo, 2015b). Alfani Yoyo from the 
Coordinating Body of Refugee and Migrant Communities said that, Operation Fiela unfairly 
targeted foreign nationals and perpetuated “the perception that migrants are to be blamed for 
37 
 
37 
 
the social ills in the country thus cementing the attitude of us and them” which has already 
crippled integration in South Africa (Jordaan, 2015). 
 
2.4 Who migrates to South Africa?  
 
Despite South Africa’s focus on creating migration policies which are based on the country’s 
security and economic interests, South Africa is the destination of different classes of 
migrants. South Africa is a major destination for refugees, displaced populations and 
economic migrants (for both low skilled and highly skilled job categories) (Tati, 2008: 425-
426). South Africa is one of the major host destinations for asylum seekers, refugees and 
economic migrants on the African continent.  
 
How many foreign nationals are currently residing in South Africa? 
 
The map below provides recent information on international migration trends. As of 2015 
there were about 3 142 511 documented migrants living in South Africa (Kirk, 2016). This 
meant that almost 6% (5.77%) of the 54 490 000 people living in South Africa in 2015 were 
not originally from South Africa.  
 
Map 1: International migration population trends as of 2015 
 
 
Source: (Kirk, 2016) 
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Legal entries into South Africa from Zimbabwe, 1983–2010  
 
Since the late 1990s more and more Zimbabweans have left their country for South Africa. 
Figure 2 below shows that in 1997, just over 600,000 Zimbabweans entered South Africa 
legally. In 2006, the number was closer to 1 million and in 2010 about 1,5 million 
Zimbabweans had legally entered into South Africa. These figures show that there was 
definitely an increase in the numbers of Zimbabwean migrants between 2000 to 2010.   
 
Figure 2: Legal entries into South Africa from Zimbabwe from 1983 to 2010.  
 
 
Source: Data from Statistics South Africa in (Crush, Chikanda & Tawodzera, 2015: 366).  
 
Deportation figures 
 
Accompanying legal entries (documented migrants) were undocumented migrants. Some of 
them have been subjected to detention and deportation for breaching South Africa’s 
immigration laws. The majority of undocumented African migrants who are deported from 
South Africa come from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Lesotho (Kabwe-Segatti & Landau, 
2008: 151). Table 2 and figure 3 below show deportation statistics from 1994 and 2011. 
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Table 2 & Figure 3: Annual deportation statistics for South Africa (1994-2010) 
 
Table 2 
Year Number of deported migrants  
1994 90 692 
1995 157 084 
1996 180 713 
1997 176 351 
1998 181 286 
1999 183 861 
2000 145 575 
2001 156 123 
2002 151 653 
2003 164 294 
2004 170 301 
2005 209 988 
2006 266 067 
2007 245 294 
2008 280 837 
2009 101 060 
2010 55 825 
 
Figure 3 
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Annual number of deportations according to the DHA
 
Sources: (Kabwe-Segatti & Landau, 2008: 151; Jeynes 2016) 
 
According to Kabwe-Segatti and Landau (2008: 151) an influx of Zimbabwean migrants post 
2000 led to a rise in deportation figures since Zimbabweans made up the majority of the 
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deportees population. The number of deportees rose sharply from 170 301 in 2004 to 209 988 
in 2005 then further increased to 266 067 by the end of 2006. During the height of 
Zimbabwe’s political and economic crises in 2008, deportations rose to 280 837. Following 
the implementation of the DZP project between 2009 and 2010, deportation figures went 
down from 280, 837 in 2009 to 101, 060 in 2010 and 55, 825 in 2011 (Jeynes, 2016). 
 
Figure 4: Deportations per annum between 2001 and 2011 
 
 
Source: (Jeynes, 2016) 
 
From 2003 onwards it was reported that the influx of Zimbabwean migrants led to an 
increase in the number of deportees per annum. The peak season for deportations was 
between 2006 and 2009 when Zimbabwe experienced its worst economic and political crises 
since independence. It is assumed that after the issuing of DZP permits in 2010 the numbers 
of illegal migrants who were deported annually went down from 280 837 in 2009 to 101 060 
because of the DZP regularisation project (Jeynes, 2016). 
 
The DHA incurs the costs of deporting illegal foreigners thus the influx of undocumented 
migrants from 2008 onwards put the department under a lot of financial pressure. It was 
reported that the “DHA’s total expenditure on deportations between 2010 and 2011 was 
R173.3 million, R168 million from 2011 to 2012 and R199.9 million from 2012-2013” 
(Mthembu-Salter et al., 2014: 12).  
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Asylum claims  
 
One of the major factors which influenced the implementation of the DZP and ZSP projects 
was the flooding of South Africa’s asylum seeker management system by Zimbabweans who 
were mostly perceived as ineligible for asylum status since most of them were economic 
migrants. Asylum claims by Zimbabwean nationals increased between 2000 and 2009, the 
period during which an influx of Zimbabwean migrants was reported.  Figure 5 below shows 
that asylum claims by Zimbabwean nationals made up the bulk of asylum claims during the 
height of Zimbabwe’s political and economic crises in 2008 up until the period when the 
DZP project was completed in 2010.  
 
 
Source: (Africa Check, 2013).  
 
It is evident that there was a general decrease in the number of Zimbabwean asylum 
applicants post 2009, perhaps because of the DZP and the period of stability following the 
establishment of a Government of National Unity in Zimbabwe. In 2009 and 2010 the 
number of Zimbabwean asylum claims per annum was around 150 000. This figure went 
down to about 50 000 in 2011 and it was lower than 25 000 at the end of 2012 (Africa Check, 
2013).  
 
Figure 5: Asylum claims in South Africa (2002-2012) 
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2.5 Mixed migration flows: a complex issue to handle 
 
2.5.1 Defining mixed migration flows into South Africa: The Zimbabwean 
case study  
 
Since coming to power in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has had to deal with 
numerous policy challenges related to the implementation of migration policies which are in 
line with South Africa’s economic and security needs but also sensitive to human rights 
issues (Tati, 2008: 423). Undocumented migrants (unwanted migrants) are one of the major 
problems which South Africa has continuously struggled to deal with. South Africa cannot 
fully control the multiple political, social and economic instability push factors which 
influence people to migrate from their countries to South Africa. Owing to this challenge 
South Africa has to formulate migration management strategies which are cognisant of its 
geopolitical situation and international migration realities and trends within the region.  
 
Owing to the mixed nature of migration flows, the close relationship between economically 
motivated migration and forced migration owing to humanitarian reasons makes it difficult 
for the DHA to determine the categories of persons who deserve to be prioritised especially 
when it comes to the asylum seeker and refugee management system (Tati, 2008: 426). 
Refugee status should be granted to “persons fleeing armed conflict or persecution” because 
the situation in their home country is intolerable and too dangerous for them to be able to 
return home (Edwards, 2016). Very often, this relates to persons who come from countries 
such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Sudan and other countries which are in 
popular conflict zones. Most Zimbabweans have fled Zimbabwe to seek alternative means of 
survival owing to harsh economic realities thus because there is no direct threat of death or 
persecution they are classified as economic migrants and viewed as ineligible for asylum or 
refugee status. Some analysts contend that, the “catastrophic collapse of the Zimbabwean 
economy has created great difficulties for South Africa” (Kabwe-Segatti & Landau, 2008: 
51). Because the nature of factors influencing migration from Zimbabwe are not the same as 
the factors which make persons qualify for asylum and refugee status it has been difficult to 
adjudicate cases of Zimbabwean asylum claims as legitimate.  
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2.5.2 Survival migration: Defining the flow of migrants from Zimbabwe in 
the early 2000s 
 
Literature tends to distinguish between forced political migration of asylum seekers and 
refugees from countries in conflict-prone zones such as the Great Lakes region of Africa and 
economic migration which is caused by individuals’ quest for better economic opportunities 
(Hungwe, 2013: 56). However, Zimbabweans seeking asylum from the early 2000s onwards 
have been a subject of debates regarding whether they are forced migrants or voluntary 
economic migrants.  Categorising them as either one or the other, as both or as none, is quite 
problematic especially because of the absence of war in Zimbabwe. However, the economic 
realities of many Zimbabweans have been so devastating such that, to deny the fact that 
economic conditions have ‘forced’ millions of Zimbabweans to migrate would be unfair. The 
effects of Zimbabwe’s economic meltdown can lead to death thus the decision to move to 
South Africa can be considered as ‘forced’, humanitarian and crisis-based survival migration 
(Hungwe, 2013: 56). 
 
The formulation of migration policies based on the economic push factor and political push 
factor dichotomy does not fully describe the migration flows within developing countries 
whereby economic challenges are often a direct result of certain political decisions. Chipo 
Hungwe (2013: 56) argues that, the distinctions only serve as tools for migrant classification 
and the labelling of some migrants as underserving of certain categories of permits while 
those coming from countries which are in explicit political crises are perceived as deserving 
of assistance. This is especially true regarding the asylum seeker management system in 
South Africa. Post 2000, many Zimbabwean applicants were dismissed as economic migrants 
who did not qualify for asylum.  
 
It can be argued that based on the economic push factor and political push factor dichotomy 
Zimbabweans were framed as the main reason why there was increased pressure on the 
asylum seeker system thereby prompting the South African government to create the DZP 
process in order to relive pressure on the asylum application system. This therefore meant 
that, regardless of the reality that South Africa has large numbers of migrant populations and 
asylum seekers from other countries, Zimbabweans became a somewhat problematic 
category which required a ‘special’ processing method. The influx of Zimbabwean migrants 
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and the reasons associated with the increased migration flows were unprecedented and they 
could not be managed using existing migration management tools. Regular work, study and 
business permit categories were not adequate because the unprecedented flow of migrants 
included: low skilled labour migrants, people with critical skills, students (from primary to 
tertiary level), small scale business operators and traders, just to name a few. The influx of 
Zimbabwean migrants and increasing numbers of unprocessed and undocumented migrants 
presented the DHA with the opportunity to work towards creating new migration 
management strategies which would cater for the management of non-typical cases of 
migration- mixed migration and survival migration this case.   
 
2.5.3 Why regularisation was the way to go.  
 
The global political economy has produced larger and more diverse migration flows which 
consist but are not limited to: refugees, students, labour migrants and trafficked individuals. 
These diverse flows have inadvertently promoted the implementation of restrictive 
immigration policies as recipient countries battle to manage immigration flows and the 
demands arising from migration flows (Hungwe, 2013: 54; Massey, 1999: 310). South Africa 
is currently the largest economy in Africa. Furthermore, there is no civil war in the country 
and the citizens of South Africa are not subjected to political violence on a daily basis. Owing 
to these factors, South Africa attracts migrants from countries which are less opulent, conflict 
ridden or stranded in political and economic crises.  
 
Since the 1990s, Zimbabwe’s economy has continued to decline and Zimbabwean nationals 
have been subjected to multiple episodes of political unrest and election related violence 
since 2000. The mixed migration flows experienced as a result of the exodus of migrants 
from Zimbabwe from the late 1990s are therefore likely to influence South Africa and other 
receiving countries to create more restrictive policies as a means of deterring migrants from 
entering their countries. However, in response to the influx of Zimbabwean migrants post 
2000, South Africa did not seek to completely dismiss Zimbabwe’s survival migrants by 
closing off its borders or continuing to facilitate deportation drives.  
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By rethinking its policy towards Zimbabwean migrants in 2009, the DHA sought to achieve 
four main objectives. According to Minister Gigaba (South African Government, 2014a) 
these were the four objectives:  
 
1. “To regularise Zimbabweans who were residing in South Africa illegally.” 
2. “To curb the deportation of illegal Zimbabwean migrants.” 
3. “To reduce pressure on the asylum seeker and refugee management systems.” 
4. “To provide amnesty to Zimbabweans who had obtained South African documents 
fraudulently.” 
 
Prior to the DZP project, the use of fraudulent South African identity books was a popular 
survival strategy which some Zimbabwean migrants adopted in order to acquire jobs 
(Hungwe, 2013: 59). A key informant who participated in a 2012 study of Zimbabwean 
immigrants’ survival strategies in Johannesburg indicated that she “picked up someone’s 
identity book, removed the photo and replaced it with her own”. Another participant 
indicated that, “some undocumented migrants used South African citizens’ identity 
documents with the consent of the documents’ owners” (Hungwe, 2013: 59). Given that some 
undocumented migrants resort to forging South African identities it is evident that there is a 
documentation crisis which has affected immigrants who are in need of documents which 
enable them to enter into the labour market. Furthermore, legal status enables one to gain 
easier access to education, health and social services. 
 
Research has shown that there is a causal relationship between strict immigration regulations 
and an increase in numbers of irregular or undocumented migrants (Akokpari, 2000: 73; 
Trimikliniotis & Fulias-Souroulla, 2009: 25). Furthermore, research has also shown that one 
of the most effective instruments which can be adopted as a method of combatting irregular 
migration is “regularizing the status of irregular labour” (Trimikliniotis & Fulias-Souroulla, 
2009: 25). However, the big question is: what kind of amnesty or regularisation projects are 
most appropriate? In the case of the flow of survival migrants from Zimbabwe since the early 
2000s, it is evident that South Africa’s migration management tools were inadequate. As a 
result, regularisation became an option which the DHA implemented by means of creating 
the DZP and ZSP projects. Before assessing these two projects it is important to look at some 
of the regularisation attempts which South Africa provided to foreign nationals before 2009.  
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2.6 Immigration Amnesty programs in South Africa: 1996-2014 
 
Immigration amnesty is the regularisation strategy of granting legal immigration status to 
persons residing in a country illegally. Between 1996 and 2000, the South African 
government implemented three immigration amnesty projects (Peberdy, 2001: 20). The first 
amnesty program was implemented between 1995 and 1996 to offer permanent residence 
status to contract mineworkers from SADC countries who had worked in South Africa for at 
least 10 years before 1995 and voted in the 1994 elections. Only “47 364 out of 130 000 
eligible miners applied for permanent residence status” during the amnesty period (Peberdy, 
2001: 20). The second amnesty program was implemented in 1996 to grant “amnesty to 
undocumented citizens of SADC member states who had entered the country clandestinely 
during the apartheid period and lived in South Africa for more than five years” (Peberdy, 
2001: 20). Only 201 602 applications were received and 124 079 were approved (Crush & 
Williams, 1999: 7). The third amnesty project was for former Mozambican refugees who had 
entered South Africa before 1992. The amnesty was announced in 1997 but it was only 
implemented in the year 2000.  
 
The aforementioned amnesty programs acknowledged the economic contributions of 
undocumented African foreign nationals who had entered South Africa before 1994. The 
implementation of these amnesty projects by South Africa is an indication that South Africa 
does not always ignore undocumented African economic migrants. Instead of offering 
formerly undocumented mine workers and former refugees temporary permits, the DHA 
granted permanent residence status to approved applications. However, following the 
implementation of these policies, the South African government began to implement 
draconian measures towards undocumented migrants. Simply put, if you did not apply or 
qualify for the aforementioned and you were undocumented, you were illegal and eligible for 
deportation.  
 
Prior to the implementation of the DZP process in 2009 a moratorium on deportations and 
visa-free entry for 90 days was introduced to allow Zimbabweans to enter and exit South 
Africa legally for longer periods in order to ease the situation for Zimbabwean migrants while 
the economic situation in Zimbabwe was being stabilised by the freer flow of remittances 
(Hammerstad, 2011: 3). The moratorium, also known as the ‘special dispensation’ was 
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suddenly revoked within months and replaced by the DZP project which would grant 
undocumented migrants the chance to legalise their stay in South Africa for a longer period 
of time (Hammerstad, 2011:3).  
 
By approving the DZP (2009-2014) and ZSP (2014-2017) regularisation projects the South 
African government acknowledged that there were many Zimbabweans who were forced to 
become illegal migrants owing to poor political and socio-economic conditions back home. 
These negative push factors had made “South Africa attractive because of its more stable 
economic status and geopolitical position” (Parliamentary Monitoring Group [PMG], 2014b). 
Unlike the three previous amnesty programmes, which entitled applicants to permanent 
residence status, the DZP and ZSP were temporary permits and Minister Gigaba reiterated 
that ZSP holders would not qualify for permanent residence status after 2017 (Gigaba, 2016 
[video file]). 
 
South Africa’s shift from creating amnesty programmes which allow undocumented migrants 
to apply for permanent residence to temporary special permits such as the DZP, ZSP and LSP 
shows that there has been a change in the way in which the DHA handles the problem of 
undocumented migrants, especially those who do not qualify for Critical skills visas or 
general work permits. In the case of the Zimbabwe special dispensation permits this could be 
attributed to the belief that the situation in Zimbabwe will change. On the other hand, 
temporary special permits may be South Africa’s method of deterring immigrants from 
flooding into South Africa and expecting to receive amnesty in the form of permanent 
residence status after staying in the country illegally for a number of years. 
 
A major problem affecting post-apartheid immigration policy is the tightening of entry 
requirements and hardening of access to citizenship (Kabwe-Segatti & Landau, 2008: 35). It 
is evident that South Africa continues to exercise a highly selective approach to migration 
management which is not only restrictive to those who intend on migrating to South Africa but 
to those who are already residing in South Africa. Should the DHA decide not to create a new 
special permit process for Zimbabweans by the end of 2017 the likelihood of formerly legal 
persons becoming illegal is high. This is so because, for some, the cost of returning to 
Zimbabwe or attempting to apply for regular permits from Zimbabwe would be too much of a 
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risk compared to staying in South Africa illegally. Furthermore, “as the avenues for 
Zimbabweans to regularize their status close up, it is highly likely that some people may out 
of desperation, seek to acquire fraudulent South African documents to enable them to remain 
in the country” (Lawyers for Human Rights, 2011b).  
 
2.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter highlighted three major issues. Firstly, South Africa’s migration management 
policies are highly influenced by the need to safeguard South Africa’s economic and security 
interests as well as citizen’s anti-immigrant and Afrophobic sentiments. Secondly, South 
Africa’s approach towards the influx of Zimbabwean migrants in the early 2000s has been 
shaped by the geographical, economic, political and historical links between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe. South Africa cannot condemn the Zimbabwean government for its failures 
because of these links. However, it was not possible for South Africa to completely ignore 
the influx of migrants which was caused by the crisis situation in Zimbabwe. Thirdly, South 
Africa continues to move towards harsher migration management strategies such as: 
declaring persons as undesirable for periods up to 5 years for overstaying, not granting 
permanent residence status through amnesty programs which have been implemented after 
the year 2000, restricting access to asylum and refugee permits and reinforcing that migrants 
who qualify for critical skills visas are the most desirable category of migrants.   
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3. Chapter 3: An assessment of the Dispensation of Zimbabweans Project 
(DZP) 
 
3.1 Background information on the DZP project  
 
According to the South African Government (2014a) the DZP project was aimed at achieving 
the following four objectives:  
1. “To regularise Zimbabweans who were residing in South Africa illegally.” 
2. “To curb the deportation of illegal Zimbabwean migrants.” 
3. “To reduce pressure on the asylum seeker and refugee management systems.” 
4. “To provide amnesty to Zimbabweans who had obtained South African documents 
fraudulently.” 
 
The Department of Home Affairs (DHA) carried out the Dispensation of Zimbabweans 
Project (DZP) between 20 September and 31 December in the year 2010 (Amit, 2011: 4). The 
DZP permits were scheduled to expire on the 31st of December in 2014, giving formerly 
undocumented Zimbabweans the right to legally reside and work, study or conduct business 
in South Africa on a four-year temporary special permit (Pokroy-Rietveld, 2014: 44). 
According to the Portfolio Committee of Home Affairs (2014c), under the DZP process, “the 
DHA issued 242 731 permits and rejected 51, 780 applications”. The DZP provided an 
alternative documentation process to the asylum system for many undocumented 
Zimbabwean migrants. According to an African Centre for Migration Studies (ACMS) 
report, the DHA confirmed that there were at least 400,000 Zimbabwean asylum seekers 
living in the country since 2008 (Amit, 2011: 7). The DZP process therefore issued less 
permits than required since according to the asylum seeker application system there were 
over 250 000 undocumented Zimbabweans seeking to legalise their stay in South Africa.  
 
Unlike regular permit application processes which require applicants to submit documents 
such as bank statements and proof of medical insurance the DZP had more relaxed 
requirements for work, study and business permit applications. The three primary documents 
required for applications included: “an application form with applicants' fingerprints, a 
Zimbabwean passport and documentation confirming one of the following: a) proof of 
employment (e.g. an affidavit from the employer); b) proof of registration with an 
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educational institution; or c) Proof of business (e.g., company registration, registration with 
the South African Revenue Service)” (Amit, 2011: 4). “The DHA indicated that, 
undocumented Zimbabweans who could not fulfil these criteria had no legal basis to remain 
in the country” (Amit & Kriger, 2014: 276). 
 
According to the Department of Home Affairs (DHA, 2014: 2), the majority of DZP 
applicants (81%) were general applicants who had not previously applied for asylum and 
were not in possession of fraudulent South African documents, 17% were persons who had 
previously made asylum claims but voluntarily resorted to applying for DZP permits and 2% 
of the applicants were in possession of fraudulent South African documents. Based on these 
findings one can conclude that the DZP project mostly attracted undocumented Zimbabwean 
migrants who had not resorted to any means of legalising their status by either seeking 
asylum or acquiring fraudulent documents. Figure 6 below shows the different categories of 
DZP applicants as reported by the Department of Home Affairs.  
 
Figure 6: Breakdown of DZP applications 
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Source: (DHA, 2014: 2) 
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3.2 The benefits of the Dispensation of Zimbabweans Project (DZP) 
 
3.2.1 Legalising the illegal -Documentation of the undocumented  
 
Since 81% of the DZP applicants were formerly undocumented the DZP process can be 
commended for allowing a significant number undocumented Zimbabweans to legalise their 
stay in South Africa. By implementing the DZP, the DHA acknowledged the reality that 
some Zimbabweans were forced to migrate to South Africa without applying for regular 
permits at the South African High commission in Zimbabwe. Because they were fleeing from 
economic and political hardships which they had not anticipated and they could not wait for a 
long time for the processing of passports and permits, many resorted to travelling and settling 
in South Africa without the required documentation. Furthermore, some undocumented 
migrants did not qualify for regular permit categories thus illegal migration was their only 
alternative. According to Julian Pokroy (2013: 49) during the DZP process some 
undocumented Zimbabwean migrants were issued with work permits irrespective of their 
qualifications or skills set thus they were not subjected to South Africa’s restrictive 
visa/permit application requirements.  
 
Tarryn Pokroy-Rietveld (2014:44) highlighted that the DZP process allowed the DHA to 
prevent deportations of Zimbabweans who were in South Africa illegally. This not only 
helped the South African government to save up on deportation costs but it saved South 
Africa from having to deal with the ineffective deportation system which had been a major 
challenge because most deportees ended up resurfacing in the country a few days or months 
after being deported (Meldrum, 2007). In 2016, Africa Check reported that deportation rates 
went down from 280 837 in 2009 to 101 060 in 2010 and 55 285 in 2011 owing to the 
positive effects of the DZP permits amongst other factors (Jeynes, 2016).  
 
The fact that 81% of DZP applicants were general applicants who were neither holders of 
fraudulent documents seeking asylum nor formerly on the asylum management system shows 
us that many undocumented Zimbabwean migrants took the opportunity to apply for the DZP 
in order to formalise their stay in the country. However, the numbers of applicants (294 511) 
and the number of the DZP permits which were issued (242 731) was very low considering 
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estimates that there were more than a million undocumented Zimbabweans in South Africa in 
2009 (Pokroy, 2012: 40).   
 
3.2.2 Relief of pressure on the asylum seeker management system  
 
Pressure on the asylum seeker application system was one of the main reasons why the DHA 
resorted to implementing the DZP. The DZP process provided an alternative to the already 
flooded asylum and refugee management system which had been experiencing backlogs 
owing to the unprecedented influx of Zimbabwean applicants, most of whom were perceived 
to be ineligible for asylum because they were economic migrants. The DHA encouraged 
asylum seekers to apply for the DZP but only 17% of the DZP permit applicants were persons 
that decided to surrender their asylum claims (DHA, 2014:2). This 17% indicates that very 
few asylum claimants were willing and/or able to apply for the DZP. Why this was so is 
debatable. For some people, asylum and refugee status permits were better options than a 
short-lived 4-year special permit. For those who viewed themselves as asylum seekers and 
not economic migrants opting for the DZP would not be helpful.  
 
Figure 7 below shows that the majority of asylum claims which were made in South Africa 
between 2002 and 2010 were made by Zimbabwean nationals. The numbers dropped after 
2010 owing to the DZP project, resumption of deportations following the adjudication of 
DZP permit applications and temporary stability in Zimbabwe during the period of the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) which had come into effect in 2009.  
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Source: Africa Check (2013) 
 
3.2.3 Crackdown on fraudulent documents 
 
Figure 8: Fraudulent South African Documents which were surrendered during the 
DZP project.  
 
 
Source: (DHA, 2014: 7) 
Figure 7: Asylum claims in South Africa (2002-2012) 
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2% of the undocumented Zimbabweans who applied for DZP permits were persons seeking 
amnesty on condition that they would surrender South African documents which they had 
acquired fraudulently. By implementing the DZP project, South Africa offered special 
immunity to Zimbabwean nationals who were in possession of fraudulent South African 
documents. The entire project is reported to have recovered about “13 251 fraudulent 
documents” (Portfolio Committee of Home Affairs, 2014c). As indicated in Figure 8 above, 
the majority of these fraudulent documents were South African passports (5 186), South 
African identity books (3 600) and Identity copies (3 378). The surrendering of fraudulent 
documentation led to the cancellation of the fraudulent documents and the cleaning up of 
South Africa’s population register while at the same time allowing Zimbabwean nationals 
who held these fraudulent documents to legalise their stay by acquiring DZP permits.  
 
Given that amnesty applicants only made up 2% of the total number of applications we 
cannot conclude that the crackdown on fraudulent documents was a strong outcome of the 
DZP process. Perhaps there were not many illegal Zimbabweans in possession of fraudulent 
South African documents before 2010. For some it may have been difficult to acquire the 
DZP since they had no proof of work, business or study engagements in South Africa. 
Perhaps many of those who were in possession of fraudulent documents preferred not to 
surrender their illegally acquired documents in exchange for temporary DZP permits which 
did not give them privileges similar to South African citizens and permanent residents. In a 
host country where obtaining any kind of permit is difficult, willingness to give away already 
attained fraudulent documents would be unthinkable for some. 
  
Julian Pokroy (2013: 49) indicated that a lot of the DZP applicants who gave up fraudulent 
South African documents had acquired mortgages, driving licenses, bank accounts and 
academic qualifications with false identities and nothing was done to correct these details for 
them upon acquisition of the DZP. Given this, any future amnesty processes may be ignored 
by illegal migrants who are in possession of fraudulent South African documents because 
there will be no guarantee that the DHA will assist them with verifying the changes in their 
identity status for banking details, academic qualifications and other important 
documentation. Giving up fraudulent documents for amnesty and in exchange for special 
permits will therefore be perceived as a risk which many would not be willing to take.  Poor 
queue management and poor public information processes led some applicants to rethink 
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their decision to apply for the DZP and resort to acquiring fraudulent documents. An 
applicant who was interviewed by the Mail & Guardian during the DZP process was quoted 
saying; “we want to be documented and to get legal status but if we are going to be frustrated 
in this way, people will get fraudulent papers” (Keepile, 2010).  
 
3.2.4 Summary of DZP project benefits  
 
The DHA should be commended for making the effort to relieve pressure from the asylum 
seeker system while also attempting to address the challenges associated with the 
unprecedented exodus of Zimbabwean migrants in the early 2000s. The inflexible and 
traditional approach to asylum application adjudication had made it difficult for the DHA to 
classify persons fleeing their country due to poor economic opportunities along with persons 
fleeing from well-known conflict zones. The DZP filled up a policy gap in terms of providing 
undocumented Zimbabweans with an alternative permit application process since they could 
not be completely regarded as asylum seekers even though the nature of their migration could 
be classified as survival migration. The DHA should also be commended for making the 
effort to document illegal Zimbabwean migrants regardless of their academic or professional 
qualifications and nature of their illegal stay in South Africa (Pokroy, 2013: 49). Research 
has shown that during the DZP process and in years following the DZP process pressure was 
indeed relieved from the asylum application system which had been clogged by the effects of 
the unprecedented flow of Zimbabwean migrants between 2000 and 2009. All in all, the 
DHA was able to manage the challenges associated with the influx of Zimbabwean migrants 
without having to go against South Africa’s jealous safe-guarding of access to permanent 
residence and citizenship status and rights.  
 
3.3 The shortfalls of the Dispensation of Zimbabweans Project (DZP) 
 
3.3.1 Time frame and planning issues 
 
Fewer undocumented Zimbabweans had the opportunity to gain legal status 
 
From the onset, civil society organisations and Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa 
complained about the short three-month timeline of the DZP documentation process. A study 
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conducted by the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS) during the DZP process 
revealed that, three months was “an extremely ambitious timeline” to reach out to an 
estimated 1,5 million undocumented Zimbabweans when only approximately 400,000 
Zimbabwean asylum seekers had been processed since 2008 (Amit, 2011: 7). The short 
timeline of the DZP process was one of the major obstacles which was experienced owing to 
overwhelming applicant turn outs which then resulted in long queues and delayed application 
processes (Amit, 2011: 7). According to People Against Suffering, Oppression and Poverty 
(PASSOP), the DZP did not give the vast majority of undocumented Zimbabweans the 
opportunity to apply owing to time constraints (Hanekom, 2011b). However, during a DHA 
update on the Zimbabwe special dispensation projects Mr Jack Monedi (Chief Director of 
Permits, Department of Home Affairs) indicated that a significant number of Zimbabwean 
migrants had betrayed the DHA’s gesture to regularise their stay by not attempting to apply 
for the special permits hence the low number of applications (PMG, 2014b). “There are still 
no accurate statistics of the number of undocumented Zimbabweans in South Africa” 
therefore whether many undocumented Zimbabweans were able to regularise their stay or not 
is subject to much debate (Hanekom, 2011b).  
 
Little time allowed for undocumented Zimbabweans to acquire Zimbabwean passports 
 
The short duration of the documentation process was a disadvantage for would-be applicants 
who needed to apply for Zimbabwean passports. The short application period for DZP 
permits made it impossible for most applicants “to obtain necessary documents such as 
passports” before the application deadline (Lawyers for Human Rights, 2010). Since some 
undocumented Zimbabwean migrants had entered South Africa with no passports they were 
faced with the tough decision of either going home to apply for passports or attempting to 
obtain passports through Zimbabwe consulate services in South Africa. Both options were 
subject to time and financial constraints (Amit, 2011: 8). To make matters worse, the 
Zimbabwean consulate in Pretoria was unable to meet the high demand for passports during 
the DZP application phase (Amit, 2011: 8). Even though the passport requirement was 
relaxed two weeks towards the end of the DZP project, the damage had already been done 
and there was no sufficient time to make applications at the last minute for many (Pokroy, 
2012: 40).  
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DHA offices were not fully prepared  
 
Amit (2011: 9) contends that the insufficient time between the announcement and 
implementation of the DZP resulted in unnecessary pressures such as inadequate preparation 
of DHA offices. The short timeline of the DZP project led to the inadequate preparation of 
regional offices thereby further exacerbating service delivery problems since no targets in 
terms of how many people to attend to daily or throughout the process were set. According to 
a study conducted by the African Centre for Migration and Society (ACMS), “14% of the 
respondents resorted to approaching more than one DHA office” in an effort to gain access to 
queues in order to submit their DZP applications (Amit, 2011: 10). Research has shown that 
long queues and poor queue management were major obstacles which prevented many from 
applying for and acquiring DZP permits (Lawyers for Human Rights, 2014). Some applicants 
reported that they had to sleep in queues for weeks at a time, “being shunted around by 
security officials and living under the most unsanitary conditions” (Pokroy, 2012: 40).  
 
3.3.2 Poor information dissemination strategies 
 
Most applicants, employers and regional DHA offices had received little information about 
the application procedures thus inadequate information was a major source of confusion 
which contributed to the inefficiency of the DZP process (Amit, 2011: 17).  Applicants and 
members of the public heard about the DZP process through the media, but media reports did 
not have sufficient information regarding the application processes (Hanekom, 2011a). Some 
of the people who had been queuing outside DZP application offices indicated that they were 
losing hope since no one was attending to them or informing them about necessary 
requirements and application procedures (Keepile, 2010). Employers were unsure whether 
acknowledging that they had employed illegal migrants would not leave them vulnerable to 
legal action thereby pressing a challenge on applicants who needed proof of employment 
(Amit, 2011: 17). As a result, some undocumented Zimbabweans were unsure about applying 
for DZP work permits while some employers were reluctant to provide supporting 
documentation (proof of employment) for fear of persecution for employing illegal migrants. 
 
More effective and detailed communication methods would have improved the results of the 
DZP process had more applicants been able to apply and submit proof of employment. 
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Further on the issue of communication, the relaxing or changing of requirements seemed not 
to have been effectively communicated to potential applicants and application stations since 
research evidence revealed that administrative practices relating to the DZP process were not 
similar across the country’s regional offices (Pokroy, 2012: 40). Regional DHA offices 
resorted to developing their own DZP management systems owing to inadequacy in terms of 
information sharing amongst the regional offices (Amit, 2011: 21). 
 
3.3.3 Ad hoc changes  
 
Almost two weeks before the deadline for DZP applications, the DHA allowed any other 
eligible Zimbabweans to apply, regardless of when they had entered the country and on 
condition that they could produce some form of proof (other than passports) that they held 
Zimbabwean nationality (Amit, 2011: 9). Since the main requirement for DZP applications 
was a Zimbabwean passport, it had been difficult for undocumented Zimbabwean migrants 
who were not in possession of Zimbabwean passports and those who held expired or expiring 
passports to apply for DZP permits during the early stages of the project. Owing to this, the 
DZP process was inherently exclusionary because in essence, the DHA sought to document 
undocumented Zimbabwean migrants who were in possession of valid Zimbabwean 
passports. The relaxing of application conditions two weeks towards the deadline was not 
adequate for many thus the exclusionary nature of the DZP process could not be fixed at such 
a late stage of the project.  
 
“The implementation of ad hoc changes led to the poor management of the DZP application 
process thereby giving significant rise to administrative justice concerns” (Amit, 2011: 23). 
Together with the problem of poor communication, the fact that new requirements were 
indicated at different phases of the DZP process means that applicants were subjected to 
different requirements which might have disadvantaged some thereby leading us to the 
conclusion that the DZP process was not administratively fair across the regional offices 
which were responsible for implementing the DZP (Amit, 2011: 19). 
 
3.3.4 Discriminatory requirements  
 
According to Hammerstad (2011: 3) the DZP permit project was less than successful because 
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it based application requirements on applicants’ ability to prove that they had been in gainful 
employment, running a business or attending an educational institution in South Africa. 
Furthermore, similar to most of its migration management policies the DHA did not consider 
implementing a gender sensitive migration management approach to the documentation of 
undocumented Zimbabwean migrants in 2009. For a long time, international migration 
management strategies have focused on migrant workers and business operators (Bach, 2009: 
14). In so doing, government departments which are responsible for migration management 
reinforce the exclusion of persons who join the informal labour sector in host countries. Since 
eligibility for the DZP was based on proof of employment or business operations many 
women who did not fit into these formal categories were excluded from the DZP project. 
However, undocumented Zimbabwean female students who required study permits may not 
have had similar constraints. In future, “gender sensitive channels of regularisation need to be 
developed” in order to improve the opportunities for undocumented female migrants (Bach, 
2009: 15).  
 
3.3.5 Problems for asylum seekers   
 
Some conditions of the DZP application system were disadvantageous to asylum seekers who 
wanted to apply for the DZP because they could only apply for DZP permits if they 
voluntarily forfeited their asylum claims (Amit, 2011: 24). 49 255 DZP applicants 
surrendered their asylum claims but there was no guarantee that all of them would obtain the 
DZP permits (PMG, 2011). “While some bona fide asylum seekers may have opted to apply 
for DZP permits because of significant barriers such as unfair asylum application 
adjudications and excessively long waiting periods for finalisation of asylum claims there 
was no guarantee that their DZP applications would be accepted” (Amit, 2011: 24). The 
required forfeiture of asylum claims therefore disadvantaged DZP applicants whose 
applications were rejected. Given that “asylum seekers and refugees who apply for temporary 
or permanent residence permits in terms of the Immigration Act are not required to give up 
their asylum or refugee status” the forfeiture of asylum status prerequisite was therefore 
unfair (Amit, 2011: 24). Even though such applicants could still turn back to the asylum 
seeking system they were left undocumented and subject to deportation (Amit, 2011: 24). 
Furthermore, turning back to the asylum system would mean that former asylum claimants 
who did not manage to acquire DZP permits would increase pressure on the asylum system 
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thereby undermining the DHA’s efforts to relieve pressure from the asylum management 
system by creating the DZP project.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
  
Despite drawbacks such as:  low levels of preparedness, a short timeline, poor 
communication strategies, discriminatory requirements and administrative justice concerns; 
the DZP was an important step in the regulation and regularisation of undocumented 
Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa. However, the shortcomings associated with the 
project reveal that a lot more could still be done in order to improve South Africa’s migration 
management systems especially with regards to planning and administrative efficiency. 
Unfortunately, there was no second chance for many undocumented Zimbabweans to make 
attempts to regularise their stay in South Africa through a special permit project such as the 
DZP. In 2014, the DHA announced that it was going to allow former DZP applicants to apply 
for the Zimbabwe Special Dispensation Permit (ZSP) in order to extend the duration of DZP 
permits (Chiumia & Van Wyk, 2014; Pokroy-Rietveld, 2014: 45; DHA, 2015a). An analysis 
of the ZSP process will be provided in the next chapter. 
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4. Chapter 4: An assessment of the Zimbabwe Special Dispensation Permit 
(ZSP) project. 
 
4.1 Background information on the Zimbabwe Special Dispensation Permit 
(ZSP) project 
 
In 2014, the DHA implemented the Zimbabwe Special Dispensation Permit (ZSP) project in 
order to document people who had previously applied for DZP permits (Chiumia & Van 
Wyk, 2014; DHA, 2015: 79). Former DZP applicants, including the 51 780 rejected 
applicants, were required to apply for the ZSP between 1 October 2014 and 31 December 
2014 (Pokroy-Rietveld, 2014: 44). Permits issued under the ZSP project are valid until 31 
December 2017. Unlike regular work, study and business permits, ZSP permits are not 
renewable in South Africa. If ZSP permit holders wish to continue staying in South Africa 
they have to go back to Zimbabwe and apply for regular permits. The Department of Home 
Affairs has not yet announced any plans to extend the ZSP or create a new special 
dispensation permit for undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants. In 2015, South Africa 
launched the Lesotho Special Permit (LSP) in order to document Lesotho nationals who had 
been residing in South Africa illegally before 30 September 2015 (South African 
Government, 2015). In 2014 the Department of Home Affairs indicated that, South Africa 
would soon initiate a similar permit process for Mozambicans and other Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) nationals (“Gigaba: SA to…”, 2014).  
 
Unlike the DZP process which was facilitated through direct interaction with the DHA and 
DHA officials, the ZSP process was conducted using a new electronic permit application 
system. One of the DHA’s strategic goals for the 2014 financial year was to complete the 
development of an electronic permit system which would be facilitated by Visa Facilitation 
Services (VFS) Global. Permit applications have to be submitted online via the VFS website. 
Applicants have to book an appointment for the capture of biometrics using the VFS online 
application system as well. During the ZSP process VFS front end systems were utilised to 
capture permit applicants’ biometric photographs and finger prints which were then 
submitted to the South African Police Service (SAPS) for fingerprint identification and 
criminal record checks (“Gigaba: SA to…”, 2014). Original documents and certified 
photocopies had to be submitted for verification on the appointment day along with a 
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payment receipt indicating that an applicant had made the required R870 (for adults) or R800 
(for minors) payment for the processing of ZSP permits (Chiumia & Van Wyk, 2014; 
Washinyira, 2015a). The DHA completed the adjudication sub-module for the ZSP since the 
VFS has no right to adjudicate permit applications (Chiumia & Van Wyk, 2014; DHA, 2015: 
54; Washinyira, 2015a).  
 
The ZSP process was aimed at catering for all (accepted and rejected) 294 511 DZP 
applicants (Portfolio Committee of Home Affairs, 2014c). In November 2015, Minister 
Gigaba reported that, “208 967 applications were made, 197 950 of the applicants submitted 
their applications and biometrics and a total of 197 790 permits were approved” (South 
African Government, 2015). The DHA has confirmed that, ZSP holders need to apply for 
normal visas from their home country following the expiry of ZSP permits and the proposed 
implementation of a new Immigration Act at the end of 2017 (Gigaba, 2016 [video file]). 
Upon the completion of the ZSP process the DHA declared that it would begin to deport 
undocumented Zimbabwean migrants. 
 
4.2 The Benefits of the Zimbabwe Special Dispensation Permit (ZSP) 
project  
 
4.2.1 Regularisation opportunity  
 
One of the advantages of the ZSP project was that, the DHA allowed all persons whose 
applications for the DZP permit had been rejected in 2010 to apply. This therefore meant that 
a reasonable number of undocumented persons could make a second attempt at being 
documented as long as they could confirm that they had a valid DZP application reference 
number. Mr Jack Monedi (Chief Director of Permits, Department of Home Affairs) indicated 
that the 51 870 rejected DZP applicants were considered for the ZSP because some of them 
had been rejected owing to “no fault of their own because of the DHA’s administrative 
inefficiencies” (PMG, 2014b).  
 
The major benefit of the ZSP project was that, it allayed the fears of DZP permit holders who 
were uncertain about what would happen upon the expiry of their permits in 2014. Had the 
DHA not created a successor project to the DZP, some DZP holders would have become 
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illegal by virtue of them overstaying in South Africa beyond 31 December 2014. In 2014 the 
DHA had declared that from 2014 onwards, persons who overstayed would be declared 
undesirable and be banned from South Africa for a number of years (First Step Immigration 
and Visa Services, 2014; Intergate Immigration, 2014). Given this, some DZP holders would 
have been at risk of being declared undesirable and some former DZP applicants would have 
been at risk of being deported back to Zimbabwe. In 2014 Zimbabwe was still stranded in 
crisis. DZP holders would therefore have been at risk of returning to a country which most of 
them had left in order to seek a means of survival and better life conditions.  
 
Had DZP permit holders not been offered the opportunity to renew their permits some of 
them would have resorted to the asylum and refugee application systems. Had DZP permit 
holders not been offered the opportunity to extend their special permits some of them would 
have resorted to obtaining fraudulent South African documents. Simply put, not having a post 
2014 migration management strategy targeted at undocumented Zimbabweans and DZP 
holders would have led to more problems since DZP holders could have resorted to 
undocumented migrants’ survival strategies which had led to the establishment of a special 
permit project back in 2009. These strategies included: asylum claims, the acquisition of 
fraudulent South African documents and simply residing and working in the country illegally.  
 
4.2.2 Administrative efficiency 
 
The DHA began to outsource the handling of visa applications via the VFS Visa Application 
Centres (VACs) in June 2014 in order to curb administrative challenges.  In August 2015, 
then Home Affairs minister, Mr Malusi Gigaba indicated that working with the VFS and 
moving towards a “digital paperless department” had enabled the DHA to improve in terms 
of efficiency, queue management and quality of services (DHA, 2015a). The outsourcing of 
VFS services enabled the DHA to tackle some of the challenges associated with the DZP 
process. The ZSP application process was not compromised by poor queue management 
because of the VFS appointment booking system. The use of a booking system meant that 
there would be no unexpected numbers of applicants queuing outside to be assisted on any 
particular day. Furthermore, the online application process which had to be done prior to 
setting a VFS appointment was way more efficient than the DZP paper application process. 
Applicants did not have to queue to collect an application form on one day and return on 
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another day to submit their application forms and supporting documents. Some satisfied 
applicants reported that the ZSP process was a much easier process since they did not have to 
wait in queues for long periods of time with no guarantee that they would be able to submit 
required documents (“Gigaba: SA to…”, 2014).   
 
4.2.3 Curbing corruption 
 
Prior to 2014 South African visa and permit application processes allowed applicants to 
engage directly with DHA officials. During such processes some officials received bribes or 
they facilitated the issuing of documents without following proper procedures. However, the 
outsourcing of VFS services for permit applications and submission of supporting documents 
enabled the DHA to curb corruption to some extent (South African Government, 2015). The 
VFS does not conduct permit application adjudication processes. VFS does not have the right 
to grant or refuse visa applications thus VFS officials cannot unfairly adjudicate applications 
(South African Government, 2016). Furthermore, VFS does not accept any cash payments 
since visa and/or permit fees are done via Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) thereby reducing 
the likelihood of acts of bribery.  
 
4.3 The shortfalls of the Zimbabwe Special Dispensation Permit process 
 
4.3.1 A regularisation project for a select few 
 
The ZSP project was only targeted at former DZP applicants therefore “it left many 
undocumented Zimbabweans in the dark with little to no means of regularising their 
immigration status” (Lawyers for Human Rights, 2014). Ultimately those without access to 
any type of permit application process would rely on the asylum system even if this was not 
the correct means of regularising their stay. As indicated earlier, the major benefit of the ZSP 
project was that it allayed the fears of DZP permit holders who were uncertain about what 
would happen upon the expiry of their permits in 2014. However, about 198 000 (197 790) 
Zimbabweans obtained ZSP permits, a number which is lower than the initial 294 511 DZP 
applicants and the 242 731 successful DZP applications. 
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4.3.2 Timeframe and planning issues  
 
During the early stages of the ZSP process, the DHA was cautioned for its lack of a clear plan 
in relation to the adjudication process (Portfolio Committee of Home Affairs, 2014c). Similar 
to the DZP process, the ZSP project application period was three months long. The lack of a 
longer timeframe therefore impeded the ZSP process. Furthermore, the lack of a clear 
timeframe to adhere to in terms of adjudication processes increased the waiting time of 
applicants and almost put some of the applicants at risk of being declared undesirable upon 
the expiry of their DZP permits on the 31st of December in 2014. In order to curb this 
challenge, the DHA announced a temporary waiver on declaring ZSP applicants as 
undesirable. Even though all permit applications were to be made by 31 December in 2014 
the deadline for completion of permit processing and outstanding tasks was pushed to 30 
September 2015, nine months after the three-month application period (South African 
Government, 2015).  
 
Since the DHA had stipulated that it would accept only 294 511 ZSP applications from 
former DZP applicants the department could have projected a timeline to cater for the 
stipulated number of applicants. Furthermore, the department received fewer applications 
than anticipated thus the adjudication and release of application outcomes could have taken a 
shorter period of time. Towards the 31 December deadline in 2014, the DHA had reported 
that it had received at least 104 315 applications out of the expected 294 511 by the 
beginning of November (Portfolio Committee of Home Affairs, 2014c). However, by the end 
of November “just over 20% of ZSP applications had been adjudicated” (“Gigaba: SA to…”, 
2014).  
 
On 21 January 2015, Bulawayo24 reported that a group called the Zimbabwe Stakeholders 
felt that many Zimbabweans had missed the ZSP application deadline owing to various 
constraints thus an extension should have been implemented to cater for those who missed 
the deadline (“Plans to negotiate…”, 2015). Notwithstanding cases of relocation, death or 
loss of interest in the ZSP, it can be said that a lot of people missed out on the deadline 
perhaps owing to the short application period. However, no extension was granted and those 
who missed the deadline were not documented. Having learned from the 2009/2010 DZP 
process, the DHA could have better utilised the lessons learned in terms of time constraints to 
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create a ZSP timeline and service targets. This would have worked better especially in the 
case of the ZSP whereby there was a set number of persons who were eligible to apply. 
However, the short time frame may not have been a major problem itself but rather, the 
combination of time constraints together with communication problems, financial constraints 
and technical issues made the ZSP process less effective than it could have been.  
 
4.3.3 Poor public information strategies   
 
One of the reasons why the ZSP process was impeded by the lack of a timeframe and low 
numbers of applicants at the beginning of the process was poor public information strategies. 
Public information efforts were once again mainly conducted via press articles and public 
media announcements which meant that those who were privileged enough to have access to 
these forms of media got to know about the process. Furthermore, media statements are often 
not detailed enough. On 5 November 2014, the Portfolio Committee of Home Affairs (2014c) 
recommended that “the department undertake educational engagements with stakeholders 
representing Zimbabwean nationals in order to encourage early applications and avoid 
congestion of the system”. Problems associated with public education and communication 
between the DHA and relevant stakeholders (undocumented migrants, employers, schools et 
cetera) during the DZP process once again emerged during the ZSP process. Even though the 
implications of communication problems associated with the ZSP were not as hefty as those 
associated with the DZP, it is evident that poor educational engagements and inadequate 
public information strategies are two problems which the DHA continued to struggle with. 
Public information campaigns were required, especially because the ZSP process was to be 
conducted by means of a new electronic permit application and appointment booking system. 
 
4.3.4 Technical constraints 
 
VFS front end systems were utilised to capture permit applicants’ biometric data and 
supporting documents while the DHA completed the adjudication sub-module for the ZSP 
(DHA, 2015b: 54). As discussed earlier, in terms of queue management, the new electronic 
application system which was utilised during the ZSP process enabled the DHA to deal with 
challenges associated with applicants waiting outside DHA offices in long queues for long 
periods of time during the DZP process.  
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Several applicants indicated that the online application system was slow at times and they 
kept getting error messages while trying to schedule for appointments or submit completed 
application forms (De Gruchy, 2015: 53). Given the reported technical difficulties associated 
with the VFS system, applicants needed to have internet access for a long period of time 
since there was no guarantee that one could complete their application form and successfully 
schedule for an appointment in one sitting. To some extent, ZSP technical difficulties 
replaced the problem associated with long queues during the DZP project whereby some 
applicants had to return to application offices on several occasions. Furthermore, access to 
the internet was a barrier for some potential applicants especially those who reported that 
they had to travel long distances to find internet cafes to apply from (Washinyira, 2015b). 
Furthermore, those who were not computer literate were not allowed to submit hard copy 
application forms and there was no VFS visa application training centre to familiarise 
potential applicants with the newly implemented electronic system. The utilisation of a new 
e-permit processing system during a short-lived programme such as the ZSP was therefore a 
disadvantage for those who were technically or financially disadvantaged.  
 
4.3.5 Lack of a gender-sensitive approach  
 
According to a Ground Up report compiled by Tariro Washinyira (2015b), some of the 
female informal traders who had applied for the DZP and ZSP permits claimed that they 
could not obtain business permits for their craft ware and vending businesses. What is more 
devastating is the reality that such applicants are ineligible for regular South African business 
or work permits thus by virtue of their ZSP applications being denied they would be forced 
into undocumented status. With returning home being almost the last resort to many 
Zimbabwean migrants living in South Africa, it is evident that the adjudication processes and 
conditions of the ZSP perpetuated the exclusionary practices of the DHA’s migration 
management strategies.  
 
The gendered dynamics of migrant flows and the economic activities of migrant groups such 
as female traders, hairdressers and domestic workers for example needed to be considered. 
During the ZSP adjudication process Minister Gigaba indicated that, “regularising 
Zimbabwean women who offer services in diverse sectors of the economy was a priority 
which the DHA would consider by ensuring that women, children and persons with 
disabilities are assisted to apply” (South African Government, 2015). However, these efforts 
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were not good enough. In response to questions regarding failed applications, Mayihlome 
Tshwete, a Home Affairs spokesperson indicated that, not every application would 
successful. He said that, it was “difficult to satisfy everyone; people will always have a story” 
(Washinyira, 2015b). 
  
4.3.6 Financial Cost  
 
During the DZP project the DHA “waived some permit requirements including application 
fees” (Chiumia & Van Wyk, 2014). However, during the ZSP process applicants were 
required to pay R870 (for adults) or R800 (for minors) for VFS services and DHA security 
clearance (Chiumia & Van Wyk, 2014; Washinyira, 2015a). Furthermore, those who needed 
to transfer their ZSP permits to new passports had to pay R1 350 for the transfer of permits 
from old to new passports (“Zimbos stung by…”, 2016). Owing to the ZSP fees requirements 
it can be argued that some potential applicants were excluded from the process because they 
were unable to raise and pay the required application fees. However, Minister Gigaba 
indicated that the processing fee was reasonable “considering the VFS infrastructure which 
had been set up to allow applicants to apply within South Africa” (South African 
Government, 2014b). He indicated that the cost of the ZSP was in line with the “user pays” 
system which would relieve the DHA from having to pay for ZSP processing costs (South 
African Government, 2014b). The Minister also indicated that the ZSP fees was lower than 
the amount required for the processing of regular work, business and study permits (South 
African Government, 2014b). 
 
4.4. Chapter summary  
 
An assessment of the ZSP process in this chapter has revealed that the ZSP process was 
beneficial in that it allowed former DZP applicants to apply for temporary work, study and 
business permits without having to return to Zimbabwe. The ZSP process was more effective 
than the DZP process because administrative issues such as long queues and weak queue 
management systems were effectively eradicated because of the online VFS appointment 
booking system. The outsourcing of VFS services also eradicated problems associated with 
the bribing of DHA officials during permit application processes. Technical difficulties and 
lack of access to the internet could have excluded some former DZP applicants from 
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applying. The time frame and planning strategies of the ZSP process were not as effective as 
they could have been given the reality that the DHA knew the numbers of applicants it 
expected. More time was needed to allow applicants to familiarise themselves with the new 
e-permit application process and VFS online appointment booking systems as well as to 
allow applicants to secure the application fees required for the ZSP process.   
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5. Chapter 5: Conclusion and recommendations 
 
5.1 Research objectives and outcomes 
 
This thesis sought to answer the following two questions:  
1. In what way(s) did the DZP and ZSP contribute to the management of undocumented 
Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa? 
2. What were the benefits and challenges associated with the implementation of the DZP 
and ZSP regularisation projects? 
 
The study noted that, the DZP and ZSP contributed to the management of undocumented 
Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa by providing them with an alternative to the following: 
inadequate visa/permit categories, a clogged asylum application system which was reserved 
for humanitarian migrants only, acquisition of fraudulent documents and illegal stays. The 
DZP and ZSP allowed Zimbabweans to legalise and regularise their stay without having to 
return to Zimbabwe. Essentially, the DZP and ZSP projects provided undocumented 
Zimbabwean migrants with the right to temporarily reside, work, study or conduct business in 
South Africa without having to follow regular permit application processes.  
 
By rethinking its policy towards Zimbabwean migrants in 2009, the DHA sought to achieve 
four main objectives. The objectives and the outcomes of these objectives are outlined in the 
table below.  
 
Table 3: Summary of objectives and outcomes 
 
Objectives Outcomes 
1. To regularise Zimbabweans 
who were residing in South 
Africa illegally. 
Status: The achievement of this goal was not very satisfactory. 
Of the estimated 1,5 million undocumented Zimbabwean 
migrants only (19.6%) 294 511 applied for the DZP permit.  
 
Outcome: The DZP project ensured the documentation of at 
least 242 731 undocumented Zimbabwean migrants out of 
294 511 applications (Portfolio Committee of Home Affairs, 
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2014c). The ZSP resulted in the regularisation of at least 197 
790 former DZP applicants (South African Government, 2015).    
 
2. To curb the deportation of 
illegal Zimbabwean migrants 
Status: The achievement of this goal was satisfactory.  
 
Outcome: According to Africa Check, in 2009 alone 280 837 
illegal migrants were deported from South Africa. After the 
issuing of DZP permits, 201 060 were deported in 2010 and 
55 825 in 2011 (Jeynes, 2016).  
 
3. To reduce pressure on the 
asylum seeker management 
system.  
Status: The achievement of this goal was satisfactory. 
However, lower asylum claims can also be attributed to the 
effects of the 2009 Global Political Agreement and the period 
of economic relief in Zimbabwe thereafter. 
 
Outcome: In 2009 and 2010 the number of Zimbabwean 
asylum claims per annum was around 150 000. This figure went 
down to about 50 000 in 2011 and it was lower than 25 000 at 
the end of 2012 (Africa Check, 2013). 
 
4. To provide amnesty to 
Zimbabweans who were in 
possession of fraudulent 
South African documents.   
Status: The achievement of this goal was satisfactory. 
However, only 2% of DZP applicants were persons in 
possession of fraudulent South African documents (DHA 2014: 
2). 
 
Outcome: The DZP project led to the recovery of “13 251 
cases of fraudulent documentation” (DHA, 2014:7; Portfolio 
Committee of Home Affairs, 2014c) 
 
Based on the data in the table above, it is evident that the results of the DZP and ZSP 
processes were not purely positive, they were mixed. The summary of the benefits and 
shortfalls of the DZP and ZSP process in section 5.2 attests to these findings.  
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5.2 Summary of benefits and shortfalls   
 
Table 4: Summary of benefits and shortfalls   
 
 DZP  ZSP  
Benefits  1. Regularisation (documentation of 
undocumented Zimbabwean 
migrants). 
2. Relief on the asylum seeker 
application system.  
3. Crackdown on fraudulent South 
African documents.  
 
4. Lower deportation rates.  
1. Regularisation (extension of DZP 
permits). 
 
2. Avoiding new pressure(s) on the asylum 
seeker application system 
3. Administrative efficiency: Improved 
queue and application management 
systems.  
   
Shortfalls  1. Time frame and planning 
constraints. 
2. Poor public information sharing 
strategies. 
3. Administrative inconsistencies. 
4. Absence of a gender sensitive 
approach. 
5. Little consideration for unemployed 
undocumented migrants. 
1. Time frame and planning constraints. 
 
2. Poor public information sharing 
strategies. 
3. Technical constraints.  
4. Absence of a gender sensitive approach. 
 
5. No consideration of new applicants. 
 
6. Financial cost.  
 
5.2.1 Benefits   
 
The major benefits of the DZP and ZSP processes were: the documentation of undocumented 
Zimbabwean migrants, relief of pressure on the asylum seeker management system and the 
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provision of an alternative permit system to manage unprecedented migration flows. Both 
processes also allowed the South African government to save up on deportation costs on a 
category of migrants who often resurfaced in the country a few weeks or months after being 
deported. As discussed in chapter four, administrative efficiency improved during the ZSP 
process because of the VFS online application and appointment booking system. Long 
queues and lengthy overnight stays at DHA offices were not experienced by any of the ZSP 
applicants because of the VFS facilitated application system. However, adjudication was not 
as fast as expected. Overall, the DZP and ZSP permit processes allowed a significant number 
of formerly undocumented Zimbabweans to live, work and study in South Africa without 
having to return home to apply for permits while the South African government hoped for 
greater stability and economic recovery in Zimbabwe.  
 
5.2.2 Shortfalls & Recommendations  
 
Short time frames, poor communication and queue management strategies 
 
According to Letsiri (2012: 60) “managing illegal immigration into South Africa is fraught 
with many challenges, most of which centre around implementation and monitoring”.  Given 
this, the DHA needed to ensure that certain essential guidelines were put in place and 
followed by means of setting clear time lines, carrying out public information drives in 
communities, ensuring timely adjudication. Insufficient time frames, lengthy adjudication 
periods and poor public information systems were major shortfalls during both 
documentation processes. At least, queue management was improved by the implementation 
of an electronic permit application and appointment booking system for the ZSP process 
(“Gigaba: SA to…”, 2014; South African Government, 2015).  
 
Administrative inconsistencies  
 
Administrative inconsistencies which were experienced during the DZP process included: ad 
hoc changes to permit requirements, different methods of communicating with applicants and 
the absence of uniform application processing methods across DZP application centres. These 
problems “gave significant rise to administrative justice concerns since there was no 
guarantee that the DZP project was administratively fair across the regional offices which 
were responsible for implementing the project” (Amit, 2011: 19; Amit, 2011: 23). These 
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administrative inconsistencies were eradicated by means of outsourcing VFS services for 
electronic applications, appointment booking and document submission during the ZSP 
process. “120 dedicated DHA staff were trained and prepared to deal with ZSP adjudications 
(South African Government, 2014b)”. The DHA was only responsible for the adjudication 
process and sending application outcomes back to VFS centres for collection. No ad hoc 
changes were made during the ZSP process.  
 
Technical constraints 
 
Despite the benefits that come with computerised systems, the ZSP process was not fault-
free. Technical difficulties made it difficult for many applicants to apply and make 
appointment bookings at one go therefore “internet access was needed for a long period of 
time” (De Gruchy, 2015: 53). Furthermore “vast numbers of people in South Africa, 
including foreign nationals, do not have regular access to internet facilities” (Lawyers for 
Human Rights, 2014). The DHA could have put more effort into ensuring access to internet 
facilities and online application assistance desks at DHA or VFS offices instead of 
encouraging applicants to call customer service lines which were often unhelpful. However, 
Minister Gigaba indicated that the DHA was confident that the electronic permit application 
system would work because “internet access is sufficiently high in South Africa” (South 
African Government, 2014b).  
 
No new applicants considered during the ZSP project 
 
The reality that no new applicants were considered for the ZSP process means that South 
Africa was not willing to consider documenting anymore undocumented Zimbabwean 
migrants after 2010. Despite the realisation that 81% of DZP applicants were persons who 
were purely illegal, not having resorted to claiming asylum or acquiring fraudulent 
documents, the DHA could have made a second attempt at documenting former DZP 
applicants and other categories of undocumented Zimbabwean migrants in 2014.  
 
Exclusionary requirements 
 
An assessment of the DZP in Chapter 3 and the assessment of the ZSP project in Chapter 4 
revealed that both processes were not based on any kind of gender based considerations. It 
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can be argued that the permit processes were open to undocumented Zimbabwean migrants 
regardless of their gender or occupation. However, it is a reality that when adjudicating 
permit applications, ‘gainful’ employment or business ownership are criteria that are highly 
considered. There are many Zimbabwean female migrants who are involved in domestic 
work and informal trading and they could have been excluded because their economic 
activities were not necessarily viewed as ‘gainful’ by the DHA. There are craftwork 
entrepreneurs and domestic workers who felt excluded because of the nature of their 
economic engagements (Keepile, 2010; Washinyira, 2015b). In response to questions 
regarding failed applications, Home Affairs spokesperson, Mayihlome Tshwete, indicated 
that, not every application would be successful and it was “difficult to satisfy everyone 
because people will always have a story” (Washinyira, 2015b). Perhaps this gendered type of 
exclusion was an unintended consequence. However, the DHA was aware of these issues as 
indicated by Minister Gigaba in his promise that, during the ZSP and LSP processes 
“regularising Zimbabwean and Lesotho women who offer services in diverse sectors of the 
economy would be a priority which the DHA would consider by ensuring that they are 
assisted to apply” (South African Government, 2015). The DHA could definitely have done 
more to fulfil that promise.  
 
Financial cost of ZSP permits 
 
In terms of cost, the DZP did not require applicants to pay application fees. However, a 
service fee of R870 (for adults) or R800 (for minors) was required (Chiumia & Van Wyk, 
2014; Washinyira, 2015a). Even though the DHA had a target category for the ZSP 
application process no efforts were made to conduct a research study or process of inquiry 
regarding how much the average DZP applicant was able to pay in the event that the ZSP 
project was introduced.  
 
Resorting to creating an early notification system would have been a better strategy to 
address the cost issue and allow potential applicants to prepare themselves to pay for the ZSP 
process. However, early notification would still not guarantee money availability. Charging 
permit application fees is not unlawful but it should be done based on the recognition of the 
financial difficulties faced by undocumented migrants in order to ensure that the fees for 
special permits are kept at a minimum. This is especially true considering that the DZP 
project had catered for undocumented migrants from different gender, class and professional 
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groups. For example, a business owner may not have had any difficulty raising the permit 
application fee at such short notice whilst a hawker or farm worker may not have been able to 
raise enough money for the application fees before the application deadline.  
 
5.3 South Africa’s intention to maintain restrictive migration management 
policies  
 
More than many issues related to migration management policies, irregular or illegal 
migration is a direct challenge to the ability of policymakers to control and regulate their 
territory and migration flows (Bertossi, 2009: 24). Consequently, the management of 
unprecedented migrant flows such as the influx of Zimbabwean migrants in the early 2000s 
becomes a highly politicized issue since policies to address irregular migration are often 
framed according to contextual realities (public perceptions and attitudes regarding migration 
in this case). Given the reality that South Africa is not a migrant friendly context, the DHA’s 
intention not to renew the ZSP and the condition that former DZP and ZSP holders will not be 
granted permanent residence can be labelled as attempts for the South African government 
not to appear to be lenient towards migrants. It is definitely not a secret that South Africa’s 
migration management strategies are increasingly restrictive (De Gruchy, 2015: 58).  
 
It has already been established that the South African government was forced to regularise 
undocumented Zimbabwean migrants because of factors such as pressure on the asylum 
seeker system and an increase in the numbers of undocumented Zimbabwean nationals and 
holders of fraudulent South African documents. South Africa’s national and economic 
interests as well as South Africa’s geographical, historical and political ties with Zimbabwe 
play an important role in determining the policy decisions taken towards Zimbabwe’s crisis 
and Zimbabwean migrants. Since South Africa’s economy is boosted by exports to Zimbabwe 
and the use of Zimbabwean roads for transportation of South African exports to other 
countries the South African government cannot close off its borders to Zimbabwean migrants. 
Furthermore, the shared history of anti-colonial sentiments and anti-western political 
strategies may continue to force South Africa not to enforce harsh conditions towards 
Zimbabwe despite President Mugabe’s government’s governance and economic policy 
failures.  
 
77 
 
77 
 
To dismiss flows of Zimbabwean migrants and attempt to push them out by means of arrests 
and deportations meant ignoring the factors which pushed Zimbabweans to become 
undocumented migrants thus some form of amnesty or documentation drive was required. 
One of the major challenges which South Africa has failed to address is the reality that the 
migration management challenges faced by South Africa owing to Zimbabwe’s political and 
economic crises are linked to South Africa’s foreign policy towards Zimbabwe (Hammerstad, 
2011: 1). The exercise of quiet diplomacy towards the Zimbabwean political and economic 
crises and the maintenance of silence regarding the reasons why there was an influx of 
Zimbabweans made things worse. 
 
At a broader policy level South Africa maintained a laisse-faire approach towards the influx 
of Zimbabwean migrants post-2000, only reacting when the asylum seeker system was in 
trouble and following episodes of xenophobic attacks in 2008. Arrests, deportations and 
regular entry regulations were maintained despite evidence of irregular unprecedented 
migration flows from Zimbabwe. Despite the documentation attempts introduced after the 
2008 episode of xenophobic violence, South Africa has largely exercised benign neglect of 
the problems associated with the influx of Zimbabwean migrants. Having quietly accepted 
the presence of between one and three million Zimbabweans for over five years since the 
year 2000 the South African government failed dismally to pay attention to migration flow 
issues between 2000 and 2009 (Hammerstad, 2011: 2).  
 
5.4 Why the DZP and ZSP were the best option 
 
According to Polzer (2009: 2) the regularisation of Zimbabwean migrants post 2008 was a 
positive shift towards a rational and realistic approach to the scale and nature of movement 
which resulted from Zimbabwe’s political and economic crises. It was in South Africa’s best 
interest(s) to respond to the influx of illegal Zimbabwean migrants by implementing policy 
solutions which tackled undocumented migration. According to Polzer (2009: 2), the only 
policy options regarding the influx of Zimbabwean migrants were to “either allow an increase 
in the numbers of undocumented migrants by taking no direct action towards Zimbabwean 
migrants or to regulate and legalise migrants as a way of improving South Africa’s migration 
management system”.  
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Based on the assumption that the special dispensation permits were unlikely to increase the 
overall volumes of migration it is therefore safe to conclude that the DZP and ZSP were the 
best way to tackle the problems associated with the exodus of Zimbabwean migrants post 
2000. Since Zimbabweans were and continue to be classified as the largest migrant 
population in South Africa it is important to find ways of making it easier for them enter 
South Africa and return home with minimal restrictions. Analysts argue that harsh 
immigration laws promote the illegal stay of foreign nationals in South Africa because the 
costs associated with returning or attempting to return home are deemed high. Given this, 
undocumented migrants often resort to staying in the host country since “return without 
unknown lived alternatives is too risky” (Polzer, 2009: 3).  
 
5.5 Future outlook: What happens after 2017?  
 
Unfortunately for South Africa, Zimbabwe’s situation has not improved to an extent whereby 
the economic climate can be deemed as safe to return to. The Zimbabwean economy is still in 
serious trouble owing to an enduring fiscal deficit, liquidity constraints, international debt and 
an unemployment rate above 80% (International Crisis Group, 2016: 2). Anti-government 
protests have spiked since the beginning of 2016 and based on previous episodes of electoral 
violence the upcoming 2018 presidential elections can be expected to be unfair and marred 
with political violence. It is therefore unlikely that when ZSP permits expire at the end of 
2017 many will be willing to return home to apply for regular permits. The possibility of a 
second mass exodus of Zimbabweans post 2000 cannot be ruled out in the near future. Should 
former DZP and ZSP holders return home willingly they may be forced to flee back to South 
Africa along with a new stream of undocumented Zimbabweans following the 2018 elections. 
Furthermore, many who previously qualified for the special dispensation permits may not 
necessarily qualify for regular work and business permits which the DHA has encouraged 
them to resort to (“Zimbos stung by…”, 2016). This is so because South Africa has an 
increasingly rigid immigration policy which focuses mainly on the economic benefits which 
South Africa stands to gain from migrants with special skills which are in short supply in the 
country. 
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Since the 2009 Global Political Agreement (GPA), South Africa, SADC and members of the 
African Union (AU) have not focused on the political and economic status of Zimbabwe. In 
the past, quiet diplomacy and ignoring the immigration effects of Zimbabwe’s economic 
crisis have had negative consequences for South Africa. Regional and continental responses 
to such migration flows are needed in order to ensure that history does not repeat itself in the 
near future and to protect major receiving economies from bearing the brunt of the burden of 
unexpected migrant flows. Even though multi-country commitments may be a viable option it 
is important to acknowledge the political constraints associated with such an approach.  
 
President Robert Mugabe once publicly threatened to pull Zimbabwe out of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). He emphasised that Zimbabwe was in SADC 
voluntarily and if SADC “decided to do stupid things Zimbabwe could pull out” (Mlambo, 
2016: 30). Recognising Zimbabwe’s sovereignty and right to solve its own political and 
socio-economic challenges it is difficult to say how best such an approach (a regional 
approach) can be implemented without threatening Zimbabwe’s sovereignty. However, 
interventions are required in order to curb the political and socio-economic factors which 
promote large flows of migrants and create the problem of undocumented migration for 
receiving countries.  
 
It is also a reality that every country is grappling with its own problems thus focusing their 
political energies on Zimbabwe should be the least of their concerns. However, when the 
influx of migrants becomes a problem it may be too late to start attempting to curb the 
problems resulting from quiet diplomacy. South Africa and her neighbours should consider 
this as we head towards the 2017 ZSP permits’ expiry date and the 2018 Zimbabwean 
presidential elections amidst increasing levels of poverty, unemployment and anti-
government demonstrations in Zimbabwe.  
 
Given that commitment is also required on the part of the Zimbabwean government it is also 
important for the Zimbabwean government and Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Home Affairs to 
ensure that they are fully committed to ensuring the issuing of required documentation 
timeously. When entering into bilateral agreements such as the partnership between South 
Africa’s Department of Home Affairs and the Zimbabwean Ministry of Home Affairs which 
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led to the decisions to implement the DZP and ZSP projects, the Zimbabwean government 
should prioritise the interests of the survival migrants fleeing from harsh economic and 
political hardships. The Zimbabwean government could have done more to negotiate for the 
extension of permit application periods after realising that providing potential DZP applicants 
with necessary documents such as passports was a daunting task. Hopefully the Zimbabwean 
government will avoid entering into special dispensation permit bilateral agreements in the 
near future by fixing the economic and political problems which push Zimbabweans to 
migrate.  
 
Given that the DHA has expressed commitment to implementing projects similar to the DZP, 
ZSP and LSP to members of other SADC countries lessons learned from the DZP and ZSP 
projects need to be taken into consideration. This is especially true when it comes to 
processing special dispensation permits using costly outsourced technical services which 
though effective in terms of eradicating queue management, corruption and other 
administrative constraints create barriers to documentation. If application processes are a 
constraint, problems such as the acquisition of fraudulent documentation, illegal stays and the 
clogging of the asylum seeker management system will persist.  
 
5.6 Recommendations  
 
5.6.1 Emulate and extend is the way to go  
 
South Africa’s response to the exodus of Zimbabwean migrants in the early 2000s serves as 
an opportunity to forge long term migration management instruments between South Africa 
and Zimbabwe as well as with other countries within the southern African region (Polzer, 
2009: 3). This is so because, migration is on the rise, it is unlikely to stop and the socio-
economic and political conditions which push people to migrate within the region persist. The 
nature of mixed-migration flows to South Africa, especially the migration of Zimbabweans 
has been defined as survival migration which means that it is expected that the worsening of 
conditions in Zimbabwe would push more Zimbabweans out of their country. Unfortunately 
for South Africa, South Africa remains the nearest, most porous and developed country to 
migrate to for these survival migrants. Should processes such as the DZP and ZSP not be 
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emulated or extended the problem of illegal migrants will continue to trouble the South 
African government.  
 
5.6.2 Documentation improves record keeping   
 
Given that the DHA does not have any reliable data regarding the numbers and demographic 
profiles of undocumented migrants in South Africa, documentation drives can enable the 
government to have a better idea of how many migrants are currently residing in South 
Africa. According to Polzer (2009: 3), special permit processes “enable the state to measure 
the volumes and impact of migration more effectively.” According to the African Centre for 
Migration and Society (ACMS), research findings have revealed that, “the majority of 
undocumented migrants were relatively unskilled labourers who were not eligible for regular 
work, study or business permit categories thus entering the asylum system remained the only 
regularisation option open to most undocumented migrants after the DZP project was 
initiated” (Amit, 2011: 7).  
 
It can be argued that, since the DZP and ZSP were mostly available to a select few, that is, 
persons who were employed, studying or running businesses in South Africa prior to 2009, 
there is a significant population that was left out during the special dispensation processes. 
The DZP and ZSP permit processes have been commended for allowing undocumented 
Zimbabwean nationals the legal right to live and work in South Africa but only a few out of 
the projected millions of undocumented Zimbabweans actually benefited from this 
advantage. However, benefits such as, enabling migrants to “productively contribute to South 
Africa’s economy and to contribute to Zimbabwe’s economy by means of remittances” 
cannot be denied (Polzer, 2009: 4).  
 
5.6.3 Lack of alternative options  
 
In 2015 Minister in the Presidency, Jeff Radebe admitted that South Africa’s migration policy 
is “not equipped to deal with the inward migration of foreign nationals” (Davis, 2015). “The 
lack of adequate options for legal entry and residence in South Africa” is a challenge which 
persists (Polzer, 2009: 4). Even though the South African government is aware of its 
economic and geopolitical attractiveness to humanitarian and economic migrants it reserves 
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the right to jealously guard access to permanent residence and citizenship. However, the 
implications of such an approach are “an exclusive and increasingly restrictionist 
immigration policy” and stringent migration management strategies (Peberdy, 2001: 15; De 
Gruchy, 2015: 52).  
 
Hammerstad (2011: 1) contends that, “for the sake of South Africa’s reputation as a protector 
of human rights, the credibility of its asylum system must be restored”. In order to achieve 
such credibility, the DHA would therefore have to ensure that it clears backlogs of asylum 
applications, conducts application adjudications timeously and ensure that persons classified 
as economic migrants do not clog the asylum application system. The DZP and ZSP 
processes enabled the DHA to reduce pressure on the asylum system and they provided an 
alternative to asylum seeking for Zimbabwean nationals who migrated to South Africa in the 
early 2000s without any work, study or business permits. Work permits are not easy to 
obtain, especially for persons who do not fall under special skills permit categories. 
Zimbabwean visitor’s permits do not last for periods beyond 90 days per year and one is not 
allowed to work or conduct any business operations using a visitor’s permit. Since the 
economic and political conditions which led to the exodus of Zimbabwean migrants since the 
early 2000s persist projects such as the DZP and ZSP remain as feasible alternatives if the 
South African government wishes to strictly safeguard access to permanent residence and 
citizenship.  
 
Mandisi Majavu (2011) contends that instead of penalizing migrants for factors beyond 
their control, “the South African government ought to consider extending the concept of 
the DZP project to other African foreign nationals”, especially those coming from the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. Majavu (2011) argues that it 
is worth noting that many people in the southern African region live in poverty and South 
Africa is one of the places, if not the only place where economic opportunities are closest 
and available. Even though South Africa has its own socio-economic problems the reality 
is that South Africa is an economic powerhouse in the region thus it will continue to 
attract both documented and undocumented migrants. Furthermore, many migrants who 
are in South Africa come from countries which they cannot easily return to owing to 
various constraints thus creating South African based documentation centres for them is 
essential (De Gruchy, 2015: 52).  
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5.7 Risks: What to consider when formulating migration management 
policy goals in South Africa  
 
5.7.1 Xenophobic attacks and public outrage  
 
Xenophobic sentiments are commonly associated with grievances regarding how foreign 
nationals are frequently perceived as a threat to the wages and working conditions of locals 
(Garcés-Mascareñas, 2013: 15). Economic explanations of xenophobia in South Africa are 
based on the reality that, “poor (mostly black) South African nationals see foreign Africans as 
competing with them for jobs, housing, and other services and resources to which they 
themselves feel entitled to” (Dodson, 2010: 5). There is also a popular perception that there 
are more undocumented than documented Zimbabwean immigrants residing in South Africa 
(Hungwe, 2012: 133). This gives rise to xenophobic attacks which are aimed at deterring 
illegal migrants from settling in South Africa.  
 
Research has revealed that many “South Africans do not like African foreign nationals 
regardless of which country they come from, and that they also prefer highly restrictive 
immigration policies” (Hungwe, 2012: 133). In the case of the DZP project, a report titled 
‘Enquiry concerning South Africa resident’s perceptions of deportation and the Zimbabwe 
Documentation Project’ revealed that, 47% of respondents “confirmed that they viewed the 
DZP project as generally negative” (“Bodies lobby SA…”, 2011; Hanekom, 2011a). 
According to PASSOP this confirmed negative and xenophobic opinions which are held by 
most South Africans regarding foreign nationals (Hanekom, 2011a). If such attitudes do not 
change, public reactions to special permit projects or immigration amnesty programs may be 
negative and result in widespread xenophobic attacks. 
 
5.7.2 The (un)likelihood of return migration  
 
It is expected that the longer migrants stay in a host country, the more likely they are to 
become integrated and unlikely to return to their home country (Makina, 2012: 376). Should 
the situation in Zimbabwe improve in the near future it is not guaranteed that many 
Zimbabweans (both documented and undocumented) currently residing in South Africa will 
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be willing to go home as soon as possible. Polzer (2009: 3) indicated that, “even in the best 
case scenario for Zimbabwe’s stabilisation and reconstruction, the migration of Zimbabweans 
to South Africa would continue in the foreseeable future”. “The decision to return home 
should be viewed against the determinants of migration” (Makina, 2012: 367). According to 
research findings presented by Daniel Makina (2012: 369), 66% of Zimbabwean migrants 
who were interviewed for a study of the determinants of return migration intentions indicated 
that “they would like to return home in the future if there is political and economic stability in 
Zimbabwe”. If not, the DHA may once again have to live with the reality that former DZP 
and ZSP holders together with undocumented Zimbabwean migrants will still prefer to 
continue staying in South Africa.  
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